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The Supreme Court's Indian Problem
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER*
[These] matters [are] more likely to arouse the judicial libido-voting
rights, antidiscrimination laws, or environmental protection, to name
only a few ....
-Justice Scalia'
[T]he Supreme Court sort of makes it up as they go along.
-Judge Roger L. Wollman'
This constitutional system floats on a sea of public acceptance.
-Justice Breyer3
INTRODUCTION
What "arouse[s] the judicial libido"?4 Federalism? Race? The
environment? The exclusionary rule? How about federal Indian law?
How can that be? Who understands Indian law? Who wants to? Why
would the Supreme Court ever want to hear Indian law cases in a
discretionary docket? But they do-an average of two cases per year
5 6
since 1953 and on occasion as many as five cases in a single term, a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law; J.D., University of
Michigan Law School. Enrolled Member, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians.
Chi-miigwetch to Todd Aagaard, Larry Cat6 Backer, Jeannine Bell, Kirsten Carlson, Kristen
Carpenter, Richard Delgado, Margareth Etienne, Zeke Fletcher, Kate Fort, Phil Frickey, Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer, Ian Gershengorn, Sam Hirsch, Brian Kalt, Riyaz Kanji, Sonia Katyal, John
Petoskey, Angela Riley, Wenona Singel, Joe Singer, Alex Skibine, and Kevin Washburn.
I. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1556 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
2. Audio tape: Oral Argument, Prescott v. Little Six, Inc., 387 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2004) (comment
by Judge Wollman at 14:5) (available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/oralargs/oaFrame.html (follow
the "Case Number" link, search for case number 03-3702).
3. Bob Egelko, Breyer: Public Support Key to Judiciary Future: Supreme Court Justice Uses
Historic Rulings as Examples, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 12, 2007, at B8 (quoting Justice Breyer).
4. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. at 1556 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. See VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: How JUSTICES AND LITIGANTS
SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA 105 (2007) (finding the mean number of cases heard per year by the
Supreme Court on Native American law within the issue of discrimination between 1953-2000 to be
1.9).
6. The 1997 Term, for example, featured five cases involving tribal interests. See Cass County v.
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998); Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S.
[579]
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proportion far higher than some other kinds of cases that attract Justice
Scalia's "judicial libido."
Judge Wollman's humorous and off-the-cuff remark during oral
argument in an Indian law case a few years back epitomizes an area of
law that is often confusing, unpredictable, and prone to obfuscation. But
it is here in federal Indian law where the rule of law championed by
members of the Supreme Court is under constant assault-and stands as
a harbinger of what may be coming in other areas that attract the judicial
or the academy's or mass media's attention. Perhaps one way to explain
what is going on is to imagine the Indian cases in a new way.
This Article asserts a new theory about why and how the Supreme
Court accepts and decides its Indian law docket: the Court identifies an
important constitutional concern embedded in a run-of-the-mill Indian
law certiorari petition, grants certiorari, and then applies its decision
making discretion to decide the "important" constitutional concern.
Once that portion of the Indian law case is decided, the Court decides
any remaining federal Indian law questions in order to reach a result
consistent with its decision on the important constitutional concern.
From the view of a national decision maker such as a Supreme Court
Justice, there is much more to a simple Indian law case than a dispute
between Indians, Indian tribes, and the non-Indian individuals,
governments, and entities that oppose them. There are questions of
equal protection, due process, federalism, jurisdiction, congressional and
executive power, and more. Indian law disputes often are mere vessels
for the Court to tackle larger questions; often these questions have little
to do with federal Indian law. And, since Indian law is not as grounded in
the Constitution as the other questions, it is more malleable; prone to
inconsistencies and unpredictability.
Perhaps as a result of this modern view of the law, federal Indian law
as practiced before the Supreme Court is in serious normative decline-
and most likely began to degenerate around the time of the ascension of
Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1986' and the concomitant trend toward
reducing the Supreme Court's docket.8 By "serious normative decline," I
751 (1998); Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998); Alaska v. Native Viii. of Venetie
Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998). The
2ooo Term featured five cases involving tribal interests as well. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353
(2001); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645
(2OO); C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411 (2001); Dep't of the
Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (2OOl).
7. See generally Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian
Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 7 (199I) ("Chief Justice Rehnquist has made it his policy to chip away
at the sovereignty of Indian nations. His policy contradicts not only the will of Congress, but also a
long line of Supreme Court decisions affirming inherent tribal sovereignty.").
8. See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, The Decisional Significance of the Chief Justice, 154
U. PA. L. REv. 1665, 1672 (2oo6); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The
1Vol. 59:579
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mean a general reduction in Indian law cases decided on the basis of
established precedent, an increase in cases decided without a guiding
legal theory, and an increase in cases that appear to be decided on the
basis of the gut reaction of the Justices. As a corollary, much of the
federal Indian law understood as deriving from cases about Indians-
cases that explored and defined the rights and responsibilities of tribes
and individual Indians; cases that could not have existed but for some
unique legal characteristic that only the presence of a tribal interest
brought out-is not really about Indians, tribes, or Indian law. What
scholars and practitioners should do is look at federal Indian law as
though the cases have nothing to do with Indians or Indian tribes.
Federal Indian law as the modem Supreme Court reads and understands
it begins to make more sense that way.
This Article attempts a fresh look at the Court's Indian cases from
more of a "positive rather than normative analysis."9 This Article's goal
is to give "systematic attention to... implications for Supreme Court
decisionmaking" in the context of federal Indian law.'" The argument
begins with a description of two classic Indian law cases in Part I. These
cases represent a vital and dynamic part of Indian law-forming a part of
the core of the Indian law canon-but they can be read as something
other than an Indian law case. In fact, these cases, while decided in
reliance on Indian law principles, include separate, independent
reasons-related to constitutional or pragmatic policymaking-for the
outcome.
Part II introduces the current state of federal Indian law. The Court
makes decisions in the Indian law field not through reliance upon a rule
of law or even through much reliance on precedent, but instead with
reliance upon its view of the way things "ought to be," as Justice Scalia
once wrote in an internal memorandum." The Court's decisions now
reflect a "ruthless pragmatism" as a result of this view of Indian law. 2
Part III offers a fresh view of several of the Court's most important
Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368-76 (2006) (documenting the Supreme
Court's shrinking docket); see also Linda Greenhouse, Case of the Dwindling Docket Mystifies the
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at Ai (noting that in the October 2oo6 Term, the Court
decided only sixty-nine cases, the lowest number in over a half-century).
9. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2o04 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 31,32 (2005).
1o. Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld- The Legal Academy Goes to Practice,
120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 68 (2006). Professor Katyal's paper on the strategies and preparations for
litigating Hamdan v. Rumsfeld before the Supreme Court should be mandatory reading for tribal
attorneys without much experience in Supreme Court litigation.
iI. David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme
Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1996) (citing Memorandum from Justice Antonin
Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Apr. 4, 1990)).
12. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 431, 436, 46o (2005).
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modern era Indian cases by placing the Court's Indian caseload in the
context of its larger trends. The most obvious trend is the severe decline
in the Court's docket. The decline in the caseload should mean that most
of the Court's Indian cases are decided in order to resolve a split in
authority in the lower and state courts. But those splits in authority
account for few cases. Other Indian law cases appear to reach the Court
because they raise or involve questions of important constitutional
concern for the Court. It is a possibility that the declining docket means
that the Court will hear fewer and fewer (if any) cases on their Indian
law-related merits, but instead choose Indian law cases because they
present an opportunity to opine on an important constitutional concern
outside of Indian law.
Part III also offers a new look at several important Indian law cases
from the last few decades, describing how these particular cases make
more sense if they are viewed not through a federal Indian law lens, but
from the point of the view of the Court and its big picture take on
constitutional law. Cases often considered core Indian law cases like
Morton v. Mancari,'3 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n,"4 and Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,'5 include
a powerful undercurrent of non-Indian law; an undercurrent that perhaps
included issues more salient to the Court's members than tribal
sovereignty or Indian rights.
Part IV recommends that observers of federal Indian law begin to
highlight the "important" constitutional questions that may arise in
future Indian law cases. This Article does not recommend abandoning
the quest for normative analyses and conclusions about Indian law, but
instead recommends incorporating a positive aspect to the analysis. Part
IV concludes by applying the template to several cases rising through the
federal court system that the Court may agree to hear in the coming
years. If nothing else, identification of the important constitutional
concerns involved in these cases will aid tribal advocates in predicting the
relative chances of success before the Court.
Where observers go wrong, this Article asserts, is by ignoring the
Supreme Court's broader agenda, an agenda driven by its receding
docket. This Article asserts that the Supreme Court grants petitions for
writ of certiorari not because the Court wants to decide tribal interests.
The Court does not care what happens in Indian Country. To assume the
Court does care is unwarranted; there is no evidence whatsoever to
suggest that the Court (as a whole) is invested in the concerns and issues
in Indian Country, which is as far from the minds of the elite legal
13- 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
14. 485 U.S. 439 (i988).
15. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
[Vol. 59:579
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establishment as any issue can be.
What does interest the Court are constitutional questions of
congressional and executive power; broader federalism issues unrelated
to the place of Indian tribes in the federalism scheme; the legitimacy,
sanctity, and authority of federal courts; and larger issues related to race
and social issues. There is significant evidence to support these
assertions. 6 These areas are now the significant areas of constitutional
concern that attracts the Court's attention. The fact that these
constitutional concerns arise in Indian Country-both in modern times
and throughout the Court's history-often is accidental. But these issues
do appear to arise in Indian Country on a consistent basis. That federal
Indian law principles do not answer these broader questions is a
significant reason why the Court deviates from Indian law principles and
even appears to denigrate them. When tribal advocates recognize these
broader constitutional concerns in advance of a certiorari petition, the
advocacy before the Court on behalf of tribal interests will improve, as
will the win rate for tribal advocates.
To be fair to tribal advocates, in at least one recent case, counsel for
tribal interests did make an attempt to bring forth to the Court pragmatic
reasons outside the realm of federal Indian law justifying a decision in
favor of tribal interests.' 7 This attempt failed for explainable reasons, but
future litigants should use the strategy as a template in future cases.
I. A NEW THEORY OF SUPREME COURT INDIAN LAW DECISIONMAKING
Consider the following fact patterns:
A court of the State of Georgia convicts an Indian man of murder
and sentences him to death. The crime took place outside the jurisdiction
of the state-on an Indian reservation. The defendant appeals to federal
courts, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The United States Supreme
Court grants the petition and issues an order staying the execution. The
State of Georgia then executes the man two days later.' 8 The Georgia
legislature then passes a resolution asserting that the United States
Supreme Court does not posses authority to review the decisions of
Georgia state courts. The Court then hears a second criminal case raising
concomitant issues relating to the Georgia legislature's repeated
I6. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L. & POL.
639, 663-65 (993); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 585-86 (2003) (providing evidence that the Court is interested in
other issues than the concerns of Indians).
17. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 105-1o (2005).
i8. Georgia v. Tassels, I Dud. 229, 229 (Ga. i830); TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF
REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS III-15
(2002).
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attempts to nullify treaties and other federal law.'9
An Indian woman sues an Indian tribe in federal court seeking a
declaration that a tribal membership ordinance is a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act.2" The Supreme Court
grants certiorari.'
The previous fact patterns are simplified versions of two
foundational federal Indian law cases. With the exception of the first part
of the first fact pattern (a case made moot by the state), the parties to the
cases argued and briefed the cases as though they were Indian law cases.
Scholars who have critiqued and analyzed the cases have treated them as
Indian law cases and they appear in prominent fashion in the two major
casebooks on federal Indian law." These two cases are classic cases that
form a part of the backbone of federal Indian law.
But it could be argued that neither of these cases are federal Indian
law cases.
These cases highlight the possibility that perhaps it is a mistake to
think of many of the cases that form the canon of modern Indian law as
Indian law cases. In the last twenty years under the Rehnquist Court, for
example, it is harder and harder to find Indian law Supreme Court
decisions relying upon foundational principles of Indian law, especially
those rooted in the Constitution. Such a conclusion should not be so
surprising. Prominent constitutional law scholars suggest that there is no
such thing as principled constitutional interpretation. For example,
Professor Jed Rubenfeld wrote:
In constitutional law . . . there are no such overarching interpretive
precepts or protocols. There are no official interpretive rules at all. In
any given case raising an undecided constitutional question, nothing in
any current constitutional law stops a judge from relying on original
intent, if the judge wishes. But nothing stops a judge from ignoring
original intent. Or suppose a plaintiff comes to court asserting an
unwritten constitutional right. Under current case law, judges are fully
authorized to dismiss the right because the Constitution says nothing
about it. Another admissible option, however, is to uphold the right on
nontextual grounds. Evolving American values? Judges can consult
them or have nothing to do with them."3
Indian law scholars have been decrying the lack of principled
19. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,519-31 , 540-42(1832).
20. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2000) (equal protection clause).
21. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (j978).
22. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 71-81, 432-39 (5th ed. 2007); DAVID H. GETCHES, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 112-21, 391-97 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing Worcester v. Georgia and Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez).
23. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 5 (2oo6).
[V01. 59:579
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decisionmaking about federal Indian law for decades.24 Nothing stops the
Court-no constitutional provision, common law principle, or anything
else-from working radical transformations of federal Indian law at any
moment. 5 The only constitutional provision mentioning Indian tribes is
the Indian Commerce Clause. 6 As with the rest of constitutional
interpretation, there are no rules, except one: the Court looks for the
familiar, a constitutional concern that attracts its attention.
2 7
The first fact pattern, based on Georgia v. Tassels 28 and Worcester v.
Georgia,29 involves questions of federalism and the supremacy of federal
law over conflicting state laws.3" The State of Georgia issued a resolution
24. See, e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 6o9, 6o9-16 (I979); John
Petoskey, Indians and the First Amendment, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
221, 226 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 1985).
25. Cf. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (redrawing the map relating
to Indian land claims in a single instant); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005)
(dismissing Indian land claims after twenty years of litigation by following the reasoning of Sherrill);
Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. REV.
21 (2005); Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38
CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006) (containing examples of the Court transforming federal Indian law);
Kathryn E. Fort, The (In)Equities of Federal Indian Law, FED. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2007, at 32.
26. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224-26 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY IO7-o8 (2005). See
generally Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. I; Robert N.
Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002);
Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069 (2004) (discussing the
background and possible limits of federal power under the Indian Commerce Clause).
27. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 57, 59.
28. I Dud. 229 (Ga. 1830). See generally GARRISON, supra note 18, at 111-15; I CHARLES WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 733-34 (rev. ed. 1926).
29. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON,
THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 58-61 (1980); PHILIP BoBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION ii8-I9 (1982); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 18I-83 (1985); PETRA T. SHATTUCK & JILL NORGREN,
PARTIAL JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 46-50 (1991); 1 WARREN,
supra note 28, at 754-61; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815 -
1835, at 731-40 (1988); DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 58-41 (2001); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS
TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 16oo-18oo, at 132-33 (1997); Joseph
C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 521-25
(1969); William Walters, Review Essay: Preemption, Tribal Sovereignty, and Worcester v. Georgia, 62
OR. L. REV. 127, 128-36, 139-41 (1983) (reviewing FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW (Rennard Strickland et al. eds. 1982) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ed.] (containing wide-
ranging scholarly commentary on Worcester)).
30. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 ("The [Clonstitution, by declaring treaties already made, as
well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are
capable of making treaties."); id. at 561 ("[Georgia's laws] interfere forcibly with the relations
established between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to
the settled principles of our [Cionstitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the
union."); CURRIE, supra note 29, at 18l-83; Burke, supra note 29, at 512-I3; Gerald N. Magliocca, The
Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 DUKE L.J. 875,905-06 (2003).
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proclaiming that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction or authority to
review the decisions of state courts.3' These cases arose in the larger
national debate now known as the Nullification Crisis, where several
Southern states argued that they had the authority to nullify federal
statutes.32 Chief Justice Marshall believed these issues would arise in the
1832 Term in the form of a case involving the Second Bank of the United
States, a critical focal point of the states' rights debate, or the various
attempts by states to declare the unconstitutionality of (or nullify)
federal law.33 Instead, these issues appeared in cases arising out of Indian
Country. All the necessary elements of the other cases were present for
the Court to announce that federal law was supreme over conflicting
state law, the underlying important constitutional concern.
The second fact pattern, probably the most famous, controversial,
and important opinion favoring tribal interests issued in the last hundred
years-Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez'4-could be construed as a mere
statutory interpretation case about whether the Indian Civil Rights Act
may be read to imply a cause of action35 and to waive sovereign
immunity.36 It is tempting to focus on the tribal sovereignty aspects of the
31. See I WARREN, supra note 28, at 733-34.
32. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 42 (Sanford Levinson ed., 4th ed.
2005); R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 79-87 (2d ed. 2006); I
WARREN, supra note 28, at 770; David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Public Lands,
1829-1861, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 783, 785 (2003); Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great"
Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1136 (2001); Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall's
Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis, 39 J.S. HiST. 519 (1973); R. Kent Newmyer,
John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Southern States' Rights Tradition, 33 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 875, 876-77 (2000) (providing commentary and background on the Nullification Crisis); Jill
Norgren, Protection of What Rights They Have: Original Principles of Federal Indian Law, 64 N.D. L.
REV. 73, 1 Io (1988); H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated
Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1292 (1985); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885,945-46 (1985).
33. See DAVID LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE REPUBLIC 357
(1949) ("To Marshall, the tariff issue seemed more dangerous to his principles. For the South ... was
not professing itself willing to obey any protective tariff law."); id. at 356 (quoting Marshall's letter to
his son in which he states: "This session of Congress is indeed particularly interesting. The discussion
on the tariff and on the Bank. especially, will, I believe call forth an unusual display of talents"); see
also Richard P. Longaker, Andrew Jackson and the Judiciary, 71 POL. S0. Q. 341, 348 (1956) ("While
the President saw the Indian problem as a temporary one, the nullification issue presented a basic
national crisis.").
34. 436 U.S. 49 (978). See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES
ON LIFE AND LAW 63-69 (1987); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 593-94 (199o); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the
Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 702-38 (1989); Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara
Pueblo Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 97 (2004) (relating the point of view of a Santa Clara
Pueblo woman); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Twenty Five Years of
Disparate Cultural Visions, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 49 (2004) (making often intense commentary
about the decision).
35. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 6o-6i (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,78 (975)).
36. Id. at 58-59.
[Vol. 59:579
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case-and they are significant-but consider the underlying questions
that could have been more salient to the Court: whether sovereign
immunity is waived where a civil rights statute does not have a specific
cause of action to enforce those rights and, perhaps, whether the Court's
nascent sex discrimination jurisprudence ought to be extended or
reconsidered. Consider that if the Court construed the Act as implying a
cause of action and waiving tribal sovereign immunity, the reasoning of
such a precedent could be used against both federal and state sovereigns.
These cases are not exceptions. It is a distinct possibility that there
are fewer federal Indian law cases decided on the basis of federal Indian
law principles over the course of the history of federal Indian law than
one would expect. Of course, while those cases do appear to rely upon
federal Indian law principles, what is becoming clearer to Indian law
scholars and tribal advocates with each passing term is that the Court no
longer applies a principled federal Indian law. In the last years of the
Rehnquist Court, the tendency began to appear as an acute trend.
Practitioners and observers of Indian law should begin to recognize
that the Supreme Court's priorities in granting certiorari and deciding
Indian law cases might not be related to Indians at all. It appears their
priorities are, in order, important constitutional concerns and pragmatic
effects of the outcome. As the above historical cases highlight and as
other recent cases discussed in Part III below demonstrate, federal
Indian law as a consistent and logical legal doctrine is not a priority for
the Rehnquist or Roberts Courts.
II. THE DEPLORABLE STATE OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
The story begins with the wretched state of federal Indian law. Dean
David Getches reported in 2001 that tribal interests have lost over 70%
of cases before the Court for the fifteen terms preceding his article and
over 8o% of cases in the ten terms preceding his article.37 One case upon
which Dean Getches focused-Strate v. A-i Contractors8 -turned much
of federal Indian law on its head.39 And that was before the 2000 Term in
which tribal interests won one and lost three cases, two of which were
nothing short of devastating to tribal interests. These two cases, Nevada
v. Hicks' and Atkinson Trading v. Shirley,4' shocked observers of federal
37. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights,
Color-Blind Justice, and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 280 (2001).
38. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
39. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and
Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1216-22 (2001); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of
the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36
TULSA L. J. 267 (2000); Wambdi Awanwicake Wastewin, Strate v. A-i Contractors: Intrusion into the
Sovereign Domain of Indian Nations, 74 N.D. L. REV. 7 11, 733-36 (998) (describing the impact of
Strate in Indian Country).
40. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
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Indian law in both the results and the "ruthless[ness]" of their
reasoning.42 If there was any doubt about the Court's sympathies in
relation to tribal interests, the 2001 Term resolved those doubts with
great clarity-tribal interests would find no quarter in the Supreme
Court.43 Others, such as Professor Alex Skibine, note that the Court has
decided forty-eight Indian law cases since 1988 following California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,' with thirty-three of the cases going
against the tribal interests and four being neutral.45
The scholarship in the field of federal Indian law focuses on three
foundational principles: (I) Indian affairs are the exclusive province of
the federal government;" (2) state authority does not extend into Indian
Country;47 and (3) Indian tribes retain significant inherent sovereign
authority unless extinguished by Congress."s These foundational
principles no longer (if they ever did) drive the Court's federal Indian
law. The large majority of Indian law scholars have concluded that the
recent federal Indian law cases-in which tribal interests win perhaps
one-quarter of the time, less than convicted criminals49-are an
abomination, a derogation of tribal sovereignty and Indian interests, and
the worst form of judicial activism and assertions of judicial supremacy.
41. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
42. See Frickey, supra note 12, at 460.
43. See Joseph William Singer, Symposium Foreword: Indian Nations and the Law, 41 TULSA L.
REV. I, 3 (2005) ("In an era when many people support a 'restrained' judiciary willing to defer to
Congress on the basis of 'strict construction' of both statutes and constitutional text, it is frustrating to
find a Supreme Court that supposedly adheres to that philosophy, yet is so willing to ignore precedent
and the text of the United States Constitution, federal treaties, and statutes in the interest of providing
equitable treatment to non-Indian interests, while showing a fundamental misunderstanding of both
the history of the United States' relations with Indian nations and the basic principles of federal Indian
law.").
44. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
45. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Teaching Indian Law in an Anti-Tribal Era, 82 N.D. L. REv. 777, 781
(2oo6).
46. COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ed., supra note 29, at 2 ("[Tlhe federal government has broad
powers and responsibilities in Indian affairs.") (emphasis omitted).
47. Id. ("[S]tate authority in Indian affairs is limited.") (emphasis omitted).
48. Id. ("[An Indian nation possesses in the first instance all of the powers of a sovereign state.")
(emphasis omitted).
49. Getches, supra note 37, at 28o-81 ("Tribal interests have lost about 77% of all the Indian
cases decided by the Rehnquist Court in its fifteen terms, and 82% of the cases decided by the
Supreme Court in the last ten terms. This dismal track record stands in contrast to the record tribal
interests chalked up in the Burger years, when they won 58% of their Supreme Court cases. It would
be difficult to find a field of law or a type of litigant that fares worse than Indians do in the Rehnquist
Court. Convicted criminals achieved reversals in 36% of all cases that reached the Supreme Court in
the same period, compared to the tribes' 23% success rate.") (footnotes omitted).
50. See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 137-38 (2005); Clinton, supra note 26, at 205-
35; Frickey, supra note 12, at 443-57; Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law
Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 468-80 (2003) (representing views from leading scholars about recent federal
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Most observers of federal Indian law cases reach the conclusion that-in
the words of an Eighth Circuit judge who was reversed by the Court in a
major Indian law case'-the Supreme Court makes up Indian law as it
goes." Legal commentators struggle to reach a conclusion as to what
drives the Supreme Court's recent Indian law jurisprudence, with some
commentators asserting that the Rehnquist Court's "federalism
revolution" in favor of states' rights has seeped into federal Indian law.53
Others assert that the Court disfavors minority rights and follows an
"anti-anti-discrimination" pattern.' Others argue that the Supreme
Court is engaged in a pattern of race discrimination against tribal
interests.5 Some assert that the Court's Indian law jurisprudence is based
on knee-jerk reactions against the notion of a third type of sovereign
government existing within the United States. 6 Still other commentators
argue that the foundational principles of federal Indian law are so based
in racism and stereotype as to have tainted all modern Indian law
decisions.57 Another vein of commentary deplores the inefficiencies
resulting from the Court's apparent ad hoc decision making in the field."
There is no shortage of criticism of the Court's apparent deviation from
the foundational principles of federal Indian law and of an apparent
deviation from the Court's role of protecting the nation's minorities from
the injustices perpetrated by federal, state, and local governments. 9
Indian law cases).
5I. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), rev'g, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
52. Audio tape: Oral Argument, supra note 2.
53. See, e.g., Getches, supra note 37, at 320-21, 329-30, 344; John P. Lavelle, Sanctioning a
Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex parte Young, Expansion of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian
Rights in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 787, 863-66 (i999). See generally MARK TUSHNET, A
COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249-78 (2005); Larry
D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 200o Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 129 (2001)
(explaining the "federalism revolution").
54. See, e.g., Getches, supra note 37, at 318-20. For an argument that the Court follows an "anti-
anti-discrimination agenda," see RUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 158-83.
55. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 5o, at 97-114. See generally Joseph William Singer, Canons of
Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003).
56. See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 43 (1987) (arguing that the Court decided at least one major
Indian law case based on its "visceral reaction" to the facts, citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
57. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 5o; Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation
Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 75 (2002); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law:
The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIs.
L. REV. 219.
58. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53 FED.
LAW., Mar.-Apr. 20o5, at 38; Getches, supra note 37, at 277-78; Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A
Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 744-
45 (1997)- See generally Joseph William Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The
Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821 (1990).
59. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 101-02 (1999); Frickey, supra note 12, at 452-60; Angela R.
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An additional factor that makes these cases difficult for tribal
advocates and Indian law scholars to stomach is the consistently high rate
at which the Supreme Court grants petitions for writ of certiorari in cases
featuring Indian tribes, tribal organizations, and Indian interests. Since
the advent of the "modern era" of federal Indian law in I959, ° few terms
of the Court have passed without at least one major decision featuring
tribal interests. Many terms feature several cases, in some as many as
five. 6' Even as Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts lead a Court that
hears a smaller and smaller docket, 6, tribal interests continue to be
decided before the Court at the same proportional rate.63 Coupling this
fact with the low win rate for tribal interests has compelled tribal
advocates to avoid appearing before the Court at all. A great victory for
Indian Country in the twenty-first century consists of convincing the
Court not to grant certiorari.6 4
Since the 2000 Term, the Court has decided several other cases
against tribal interests. Three are of import for the purposes of this
Article-Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop
Community of the Bishop Colony,6' Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi
Nation,66 and, perhaps the most important and destabilizing decision in
modern federal Indian law, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation.67
These cases exemplify the very recent degradation of the foundations of
Riley, "Straight Stealing": Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection, 8o WASH. L.
REV. 69, 118-i9 (2005); Singer, supra note 55, at 643. See generally Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial
Equality: Old and New Strains and American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333 (2004).
6o. WILKINSON, supra note 56, at I (naming Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), as the onset of
the "modern era of federal Indian law").
61. See supra note 6.
62. See Posner, supra note 9, at 35 ("The number of decisions reviewable by the Supreme Court is
growing; the number of decisions reviewed by the Court is declining."); Greenhouse, supra note 8
(reporting that the Court decided sixty-eight cases in the October 2006 Term, the lowest number since
1953). Compare The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 426 (2005)
(noting that the Court decided eighty cases in the 2004 Term), with The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-
Leading Cases, Ioo HARV. L. REV. 100, 304 (1986) (noting that the Court decided 159 cases in the 1986
Term).
63. In the 2005 Term, the Court heard Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. i50 (2oo6), and Wagnon v.
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 US. 95 (2005). In the 2004 Term, the Court heard City of
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), and Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631
(2005). In the 2003 Term, the Court heard South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004), and United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). In the 2002 Term,
the Court heard Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Indian Community of the
Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003), United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003), and United
States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
64. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Means Case a Supreme Affirmation of Tribal Sovereignty, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 20, 2006, at A3, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?
id=io9641386I.
65. 538 U.S. 701 (2003).
66. 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
67. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
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federal Indian law by the Supreme Court, but they are mere extensions
of a longer trend that can be traced back to the appointment of Justice
Rehnquist to the Court in I97i and his elevation to Chief Justice in
1986. While as Chief Justice, he did not write the lead opinions in many
Indian law decisions, the doctrinal origins of these cases can be traced
back to the damage done by then-Justice Rehnquist in the 197OS and
early i98os to foundational principles of federal Indian law.9
Then-Justice Rehnquist's Indian law jurisprudence stretches back to
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation.' In that case, Justice Rehnquist rewrote the presumptions
and the analytic framework to which the Court had been faithful since
the beginning of the modern era, Williams v. Lee.' Justice Rehnquist's
Indian law cases reversed presumptions in favor of tribal immunities to
state regulation and taxation,72 replaced bright-line rules favoring tribal
interests with balancing tests favoring states and local governments, 3
eliminated tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers,74 eviscerated
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers,75 and limited both the federal
trust responsibility toward Indian tribes76 and the canons of construing
Indian treaties and statutes to the benefit of Indians and Indian tribes.77
Then-Justice Rehnquist's efforts in this new Indian law jurisprudence did
not appear to provide a reasonable theory for the decisions or the
departures from the hallowed foundational principles of federal Indian
law. Unfortunately, his attitude about Indians and Indian peoples
perhaps can be summed up in his solitary and pithy dissent in United
States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,78 where he accused the majority of
engaging in "revisionist history" by asserting that the Sioux Indians were
backstabbing savages.79
These cases formed a base that have made the Court's federal Indian
law decisions since the ascension of Chief Justice Rehnquist easy cases
for the Court, with many of the most damaging cases being unanimous
68. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2005).
69. See generally BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 29, at 192-95; WILLIAMS, supra note 5o, at 97-
I I3; Johnson & Martinis, supra note 7.
70. 425 U.S. 463 (976).
71. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
72. See, e.g., Moe, 425 U.S. at 475-83.
73. See id.
74. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195-212 (978).
75. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (i981).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 707-08 (1987); Nevada v. United
States, 463 U.S. 110, 127-28 (1983).
77. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586-6o5 (1977).
78. 448 U.S. 371, 424 (i98o) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); WILLIAMS, supra note 5o, at 118-22.
79. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 435, 437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting SAMUEL ELIOT
MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 539-40 (1965)).
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decisions."' While some may now question the Rehnquist Court's success
in its so-called "federalism revolution ''s ' and other areas where it rolled
back the jurisprudence of the Warren Court,"' there is a strong argument
that the Rehnquist Court did accomplish one very clear task-killing
federal Indian law.
This Part offers a description of federal Indian law as it once was and
how it is now after the end of the Rehnquist Court. These are two very
different eras of federal Indian law.
A. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
The true foundation of all of federal Indian law includes the treaties
executed by Indian tribes and the federal government, alongside the
thousands of acts of Congress relating to Indians and Indian tribes and
thousands of federal regulations promulgated by federal agencies
administering American Indian policy. In 1941, Felix and Lucy Cohen
collected the entire body of treaties, statutes, and regulations and
reduced them into one massive comprehensive treatise-the Handbook
of Federal Indian Law, published by the United States Department of
Interior."3 The Handbook remains today the standard-bearer for the
collection of federal statutory and treaty law applicable to Indians and
Indian tribes, but it also remains the clearest source of the general
principles and specific rules of federal Indian law. The Handbook and its
successors (with one notable exception 84) constitute one of the most
successful treatises in American law.
So much of federal Indian law is the federal law announced by the
8o. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
522 U.S. 520 (1998).
81. Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States' Rights Blues to Blue States' Rights. Federalism After the
Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 8o8 (20o6).
82. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. I (1995); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really so Defense-
Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really so Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices,
in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 62 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
83. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942) [hereinafter COHEN, HANDBOOK
1942 ed.]; see also Lucy Kramer Cohen et al., Felix Cohen and the Adoption of the IRA, in INDIAN
SELF-RULE: FIRST-HAND AcCOUNTS OF INDIAN-WHrrE RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 70, 70-
72 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986).
84. The 1958 edition was the product of Termination Era Department of Justice attorneys to
revise the Handbook-often without new or additional precedent-to reach conclusions contrary to
(or limiting) the original conclusions favoring tribal sovereignty and Indian rights. See Vine Deloria,
Jr., Book Review, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 121, 123-24 (1982); Ralph W. Johnson, Indian Tribes and the
Legal System, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1021, 1036-37 (1997).
85. The original edition (1942) has been cited by state and federal courts upwards of two hundred
times; the 1982 edition has been cited over four hundred times; and the 2005 edition has already been
cited several times by federal and state courts. The disgraced (disgraceful) 1958 edition was cited over
one hundred times; however, many of these citations were to non-controversial portions of the
Handbook.
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Supreme Court.86 Much of the basis for federal Indian law derives from
what Charles Wilkinson called the Marshall Trilogy of casesST-Johnson
v. M'Intosh,8w Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,89 and Worcester v. Georgia.'
Chief Justice Marshall's majority opinions in Johnson and Worcester,
alongside his lead opinion in Cherokee Nation, declared several critical
and longstanding common law principles regarding the relationship
between the federal government, states, and Indian tribes, and provided
a template for analyzing and interpreting the law in relation to disputes
between the three sovereigns." The holdings of the cases, while
significant, nonetheless are secondary to the reasoning of the cases, as
Justice Baldwin asserted in his Cherokee Nation concurrence.9'
Johnson famously adopted the Doctrine of Discovery as the
foundation for land titles in the United States.93 The Court held that
Indian tribes did not own the land upon which they lived and used, but
instead the European nations and their American successors acquired
fee simple title in the land by virtue of discovering the land.94 The Court
announced that Indian tribes did have the right of possession and use, a
right that could be extinguished only by the federal government through
purchase or conquest.95 Johnson became the first instance of what the
Court now calls "implicit divestiture," 96 or a finding by the Court that an
86. See CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT § i7, at 313 (1922) ("These [constitutional provisions] leave untouched the general
field of constitutional power to deal with Indian affairs, and it has been necessary for the Supreme
Court to build up here a very considerable body of unwritten constitutional law." (discussing the
Indian Commerce Clause and the Indians Not Taxed Clauses)).
87. WILKINSON, supra note 56, at 24.
88. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
89. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
90. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
91. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV.
627, 648-74 (2oo6).
92. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 32 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
93. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573. The case is a foundational case in most first-year property
classes, appearing as one of the first cases excerpted in property casebooks. See, e.g., JESSE
DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 3-9 (6th ed. 2006); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES.
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 4-13 (4th ed. 2006); see also JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES
AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 175-78 (2O00).
94. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574. For background on whether the Doctrine of Discovery
did confer fee title or a mere preemption right prior to Johnson, compare ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE
AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS AND CLARK, AND MANIFEST
DESTINY (2oo6) (asserting fee title), with LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE
DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005) (asserting
preemption right).
95. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
96. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (defining "implicit divestiture" as "that
part of sovereignty which the Indian implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status"). For
commentary on "implicit divestiture," see Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction
over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1053-67 (2006); Bethany R. Berger,
"Power over this Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM.
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aspect of tribal inherent sovereignty has been divested'-not by an
express Act of Congressg-but by implication through the lens of federal
policy and national necessity' or, as the Court later stated, as a result of
the dependency of Indian tribes upon the federal government. ° Johnson
recognized that history plays an important role in contextualizing Indian
cases.
The second case in the Trilogy, Cherokee Nation, held that Indian
tribes were not "foreign nations" as used in the Constitution for purposes
of the Court's original jurisdiction.' ° The opinion held that Indian tribes
did retain aspects of nationality and created the label "domestic
dependent nations" for Indian tribes," a label that sticks today. The
holding itself is very narrow, with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion being
curt and somewhat conclusory. I 4 Only one other Justice joined his lead
opinion. Critical to the holding was the conclusion that Indian tribes are
"dependent" on the United States, a conclusion reached through an
interpretation of the Cherokee Nation's treaties where they consented to
be "dependent" upon the United States for military protection. 5 Two
& MARY L. REV. 1957, 2046-49 (2004); N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating
Legitimate Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 371 (1994); Philip P.
Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: A Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal
Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. I, 43-48 (1999); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent,
Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1160-64
(I990); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 1o7 HARV. L. REV. 381, 393-437, 437 n.243 (1993); David H.
Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law,
84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1595-1617 (1996); Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society's Judicial Reluctance
to Allow Tribal Civil Law to Apply to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography
and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 800-05 (1996); and Alex Tallchief Skibine,
The Court's Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in
Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267, 270-80 (2ooo).
97. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574 ("In the establishment of these relations, the rights of
the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a
considerable extent, impaired.") (emphasis added).
98. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 (1982) ("Only the Federal
Government may limit a tribe's exercise of its sovereign authority." (citing United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313,322 (1978))).
99. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153
(i98o) ("Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent status. This Court
has found such a divestiture in cases where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with
the overriding interests of the National Government, as when the tribes seek to engage in foreign
relations, alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal consent, or prosecute non-Indians in
tribal courts which do not accord the full protections of the Bill of Rights.") (emphasis added).
ioo. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 229 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2ooi) (quoting
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,564 (1981)).
1Ol. See Fletcher, supra note 91, at 677-81.
102. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) t, 20 (1831).
1O3. Id. at 17.
104. See id. at 15-20; Fletcher, supra note 91, at 639-42.
1O5. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17-18; Fletcher, supra note 91, at 649-54.
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Justices wrote stinging concurrences arguing that Indians and Indian
tribes were too degraded and insignificant to meet the international law
definition of "nation" at all, and agreeing that Indian tribes were
dependent.",6 Justice Thompson, joined by Justice Story, later added a
dissent that argued for finding that Indian tribes such as the Cherokee
Nation are foreign nations, whether understood to be so by the Founders
or not.'" Applying international law principles, the dissent argued that
the Cherokee Nation did not lose its status as a foreign nation by virtue
of agreeing to be dependent on the United States for military protection
any more than (using more contemporary analogs) Monaco or the
Vatican loses its status as a nation by virtue of their military dependence
on their host countries."
The final piece of the Trilogy is Worcester, where Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion garnered a five to one majority holding that the laws
of the State of Georgia do not extend into Indian Country where they
conflict with federal laws or Indian treaties."'° Worcester laid the
framework for analyzing disputes involving Indian tribes by looking first
and foremost to Indian treaties"' and then Acts of Congress."' The
opinion departed from Cherokee Nation's labeling of Indian tribes as
"domestic dependent nations" and adopted the reasoning of the
dissenters in Cherokee Nation, dropping the label "domestic dependent
nation" in favor of "distinct, independent political communities .... Of
course, Chief Justice Marshall retired a few years later and no later
opinion adopted this phrase or extended the reasoning. In the last few
decades, the Court almost never cites Worcester for any proposition
other than the undisputed tenet that tribes retain some sovereignty.'
The Court has long ago departed from the platonic notion that state law
has no force in Indian Country."'
Io6. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 23-27 (Johnson, J., concurring): id. at 48-51
(Baldwin, J., concurring).
107. See id. at 50-53 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
io8. See id. at 53.
io9. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
IiO. See id. at 547 (interpreting the treaty term, "protection"); id. at 553-54 (interpreting the treaty
term, "manage all their affairs").
iii. See id. at 540-41 (reviewing the Trade and Intercourse Acts).
112. Id. at 557-58.
113. Citations to Worcester's principles now are made more often in dissent. See, e.g., Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 147 n.40 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 423
n.2 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775. 791-92, 795
(i99i) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 705 n.3 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
114. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2ooI) (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (198o)); see also Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 762 n.2
(1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'The general notion drawn from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Worcester v. Virginia, that an Indian reservation is a distinct nation within whose boundaries state law
cannot penetrate, has yielded to closer analysis when confronted, in the course of subsequent
HeinOnline -- 59 Hastings L.J. 595 2007-2008
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Critical foundational principles of federal Indian law originated with
the Trilogy. First, Indian tribes and individual Indians did not own their
traditional and aboriginal territories in fee simple-the United States
did."5 Second, federal authority in the field of Indian affairs is both
plenary (by virtue of Indian dependency) and exclusive (by virtue of
federal constitutional supremacy). 6 Third, Indian tribes are nations and
retain their sovereign authority except as limited by the federal
government."7 Other less significant but important questions originated
in the Trilogy as well. For one, the Court held that Indian treaties must
be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them." While the
Court is not always faithful to this canon of construction- even in the
Trilogy" 9-the rule is an important part of federal Indian law and even
extends to the interpretation of statutes enacted for the benefit of
Indians or Indian tribes. ° For another, the Court's conclusions about
tribal dependency and weakness provided the theoretical basis for the
special relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government, a
relationship often referred to as a trust relationship.'2 ' According to the
Court, tribal dependency requires the government to treat Indians and
tribes with special fairness and consideration.'22 While the Court often
refused to condemn federal government actions that appeared to violate
this special trust relationship,'23 the concept remains an important part of
federal Indian law and federal Indian policy to this day.'24
developments, with diverse concrete situations."' (quoting Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S.
6o, 72 (1962)) (internal citations omitted)); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 257 (1992) (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557, but then
asserting: "The 'platonic notions of Indian sovereignty' that guided Chief Justice Marshall have, over
time, lost their independent sway"); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 4o8, 451 nn.l-2 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in No. 87-1622 and
dissenting in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498,
527 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,574 (1823).
116. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557-58, 561.
117. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15-20 (1831); COHEN, HANDBOOK 1942 ed.,
supra note 83, § i, at 122.
i18. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 546-47.
119. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17-18 (interpreting the treaty term "protection" to
the detriment of the Cherokee Nation).
120. See COHEN's HANDBOOK 1982 ed., supra note 29, § 2.02, at 119-28. But cf Chickasaw Nation v.
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2oo1) ("Nor can one say that the pro-Indian canon is inevitably
stronger-particularly where the interpretation of a congressional statute rather than an Indian treaty
is at issue.").
121. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ed., supra note 29, § 5.04[4], at 418-23.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,384 (1886).
123. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 290-91 (955) (refusing to
require the United States to pay just compensation for taking of tribal property); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,566-68 (1903) (allowing Congress to unilaterally abrogate an Indian treaty).
124. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ed., supra note 29, § 5.04[4][a], at 419 ("Today the trust doctrine
is one of the cornerstones of Indian law.").
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B. THE EROSION OF THE FOUNDATION
Much like the Contracts Clause jurisprudence of the Marshall
Court,'25 the Marshall Court's Indian law jurisprudence has eroded over
time, although it took a much longer time. The Court's decisions of the
past twenty years, in particular, have been at odds with the foundational
principles as articulated by the Marshall Court, but the Court has not
gone so far as to overrule any of the cases in the Trilogy."' In fact, as
some scholars suggest, the Court appears to take the easy way out by
simply ignoring those foundational cases.'27 This recent jurisprudence
appears sloppy, leading some scholars to suggest that the Rehnquist
Court was laden with animus toward Indians and tribes."" As the Court
itself sometimes recognizes, its decisions in the field are contradictory or
even schizophrenic.'29 The Court appears very uncomfortable and
suspicious of Indian tribes because the Constitution does not incorporate
them into "Our Federalism""'3 and, as a result, the Court's supervisory
power over tribal courts is very limited. 3' The Court also appears very
125. Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 647, 648, 685-86 (1988) (acknowledging that many commentators believed the
Contracts Clause was "dead" from the Depression Era until the i97os or i98os). See generally Horace
H. Hagan, The Dartmouth College Case, 19 GEO. L.J. 411 (1931); Horace H. Hagan, Fletcher vs. Peck,
i6 GEo. L.J. 1 (1927).
I26. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of "Domestic Dependent Nations" in the
Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH
L. REV. 443,471.
127. Cf. Getches, supra note Ii, at 1594, 1654.
128. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 5o, at 131-33 (arguing that at least some of the Court's
members are "aversive racists," persons who make racist decisions without ever admitting or even
acknowledging their racism).
129. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Robert
Laurence, Don't Think of a Hippopotamus: An Essay on First-Year Contracts, Earthquake Prediction,
Gun Control in Baghdad, The Indian Civil Rights Act, The Clean Water Act, and Justice Thomas's
Separate Opinion in United States v. Lara, 40 TULSA L. REV. 137, 148 (2004) ("It is my opinion, of
course, that it is possible to hold two contradictory thoughts in one's mind at one time, and that the
complexity of the law requires it. Of course, American Indian law is schizophrenic. So is the Clean
Water Act. So is the common law of contracts. So is the war in Iraq."); Skibine, supra note 39, at 267
("With two hundred years worth of un-discarded baggage, and antiquated and often contradictory
theories, the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence in the field of federal Indian law has mystified
both academics and practitioners.").
130. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 218-I9 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). See generally Richard A.
Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States and Tribes
in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 617 (i994); Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within "Our Federalism": Beyond the Dependency
Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REv. 667 (2006); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal
Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. &
C.R. 1 (2003); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Dualism and the Dialogic of Incorporation in Federal Indian
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 28 (2oo6), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/ix9/decO5/
skibine.pdf.
131. See, e.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-57 (985)
(holding that a federal court may have jurisdiction over tribal court cases but only to the extent
necessary to decide tribal court jurisdiction); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71-72
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uncomfortable with federal plenary and exclusive power over Indian
affairs where the single provision in the Constitution that authorizes
federal control only relates to commerce with Indian tribes.'32 Perhaps
most importantly, as Professor Phil Frickey argues, the Court is
uncomfortable with being unable to reconcile federal Indian law with the
rest of its constitutional jurisprudence.'33
One can make a reasonable argument that the Court's decisions in
the field from 1832's Worcester v. Georgia until 1959's Williams v. Lee
amounted to little more than an interregnum where the Court
announced very little federal Indian law. That period could be best be
characterized as a period in which an incredible, rich, and devastating
history of federal Indian policy landed on Indian people' 34 while the
Court stood by and watched like the house by the side of the road (as
Ernie Harwell would say), citing to the political question doctrine
whenever a difficult Indian law question arose.'35
But Williams offered a dramatic interruption of that period in a
short opinion by Justice Black that recognized the exclusive authority of
tribal courts to adjudicate matters arising out of Indian Country. I36 The
holding in Williams was consistent with the Trilogy's foundational
principles that state law did not extend into Indian Country and that
Indian tribes retain aspects of sovereignty not expressly divested by
Congress. ' The result helped to vitalize the development of tribal courts
and tribal governments, 3  a development that continues today at an
impressive rate.'
In the first part of the modern era, from 1959 to about 1986, a time I
(1978) (holding that the Indian Civil Rights Act did not create a cause of action in federal courts
except in criminal cases).
132. See, e.g., Lara, 541 U.S. at 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
133. See generally Frickey, supra note 12, at 36.
134. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ed., supra note 29, §§ 1.03[41-I.o6, at 45-96 (describing federal
Indian policy from 1815 to 1961).
135. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281 (I955); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (i9o3); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407,
419 (1865); cf. Del. Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193 U.S. 127, I44 (1904) (holding that a dispute
between Indian tribes is a tribal political question not subject to federal court review); Roff v. Burney,
i68 U.S. 218, 222 (1897) (holding that a tribal membership dispute is a tribal political question).
136. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959).
137. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 56o-61 (1832).
138. Cf FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
TRIBAL LIFE 91 (1995) (noting that tribes have "an enduring responsibility to provide a local forum for
adjudication of cases").
139. See generally B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues
in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457 (1998); Nell Jessup
Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 285 (1998); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and
Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313 (1997).
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have called the "permissive modern era,"' 4° tribal interests were
victorious before the Court in a large majority of cases. Professor Alex
Skibine estimated recently that tribal interests won just under 6o% of
their cases before the Court during this time."' While there were
significant losses later in the period, such as Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe,'42  Montana v. United States,' 43  and Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation"4 (all of which
were driven by Justice Rehnquist), the Court abided by the Trilogy's
foundational principles in large measure. The Court's decisions in the
area of taxation-cases such as Central Machinery v. Arizona Tax
Commission 4' and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe16 -recognized the
general rule of tribal immunity from state taxation and recognized the
inherent sovereign authority of Indian tribes to tax those within their
jurisdictions. United States v. Wheeler cemented tribal criminal
jurisdiction over tribal members in Indian Country.147 That case also
reaffirmed that tribal governments are separate sovereigns.4
Additionally, Justice Marshall's decision in National Farmers Union
Insurance Cos. in 1985 provided a framework for the eventual
recognition of tribal court judgments in federal court.'49
Several surprising, even disturbing, lines of cases followed the
ascension of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1986. A superficial review of
these decisions is helpful for now.
First, the Court began to reinterpret its 1981 decision, Montana v.
United States,5 0 to expand its meaning far beyond the very narrow factual
situation presented in that case.'5' The Court's decisions in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation'52 and South
Dakota v. Bourland'53 served to rewrite the relationship between Indian
tribes and nonmembers located within their territorial jurisdiction by
adopting a presumption that Indian tribes do not have jurisdiction over
140. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Legal Culture War Against Tribal Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 93, 99-1Ol (2007).
141. See Skibine, supra note 45, at 781.
142. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
143. 450 U.S. 544 (I98I).
144. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
145. 448 U.S. 16o (198o).
146. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
147. 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (I978).
148. Id. at 323.
149. 471 U.S. 845,857 & n.25 (1985) (citing tribal court cases).
150. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
I5I. See Judith V. Royster, Montana at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 631, 631 (2006)
(describing efforts of Justice Souter to expand the Montana general rule).
152. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
153. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
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nonmembers.'" This is the opposite of the meaning of the Worcester case.
For some commentators (and the Court), Montana is now the
foundational case for the current Court, overruling by implication the
Worcester decision.'55 The Court now treats Montana as the criminal
jurisdiction parallel to Oliphant, creating the expectation that, sometime
in the near future, the Court will adopt a bright-line rule eliminating civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers, just as it adopted a bright-line rule in
Oliphant eliminating criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers."6
A concomitant result of the expansion of Montana is the
deterioration of the adjudicatory jurisdiction of tribal courts that the
Court is willing to recognize. In Strate v. A-i Contractors,'57 perhaps the
most damaging case of all the Rehnquist Court's Indian law decisions,
x
,8
the Court called Montana the "pathmarking" case in the field,"9 and
sharply limited the exceptions to the Montana rule'6-the so-called
Montana i and Montana 2 exceptions. 6' Tribal advocates had presumed
that the Court would invoke the Montana 2 exception in cases where the
clear focus of the case was in Indian Country,'"2 but instead the Strate
Court all but defined the exceptions out of existence. The Court's
decision in Strate came close to being the case that adopted a bright-line
rule eliminating tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, but the Court's
decision in Nevada v. Hicks'63 came even closer, with Justice Souter's
concurring opinion providing an argument that tribal law is "unusually
difficult for an outsider to sort out" as justification for adopting the
bright-line rule.'64
Second, in Duro v. Reina,'65 the Court attempted to expand its
prohibition on tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, which it had
154. See John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen's Handbook
Cutting Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731, 744-47 (2oo6); Royster, supra note 151, at 636-37; Skibine,
supra note 39, at 298.
155. See, e.g., Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REv. 75, 86-87 (2oo3);
Singer, supra note 55, at 652. See generally Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997)
(designating Montana as the "pathmarking" case).
156. This is the "open question" as designated by Justice Scalia in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353,
358 n.2 (2oo1).
157. 520 U.S. 438 (997).
158. Cf Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism, and Cultural Pluralism: Where Do
Indigenous Peoples Fit Within Civil Society?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 384 (2003) ("The Court's
opinion in Strate v. A-i Contractors continued the conception of tribal sovereignty as one essentially
limited to tribal members.").
159. Strate, 520 U.S. at 445.
16o. See id. at 456-59; LaVelle, supra note 154, at 755-59.
i61. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,565-66 (i98x).
162. See Brief of Petitioners at 8-1i, Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (t997) (No. 95-1872).
163. 533 U.S. 353 (20o1).
164. Id. at 384-85 (Souter, J., concurring).
165. 495 U.S. 676 (ig9o).
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already done in Oliphant,'66 by holding that tribes cannot have criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.' 67 Congress quickly enacted the
"Duro Fix,"' 68 but the doctrinal damage had been done.' 6' Oliphant was
the first case to utilize the doctrine of implicit divestiture since the
Trilogy.'70 Each time the Court finds that an area of tribal sovereign
authority has been implicitly divested adds an amount of legitimacy to
the doctrine by piling precedent on top of creaky precedent. Ironically,
one could argue that the "Duro Fix" itself served to codify the practice,
leaving the Court to believe that Congress acquiesces in the judicial
divestiture of tribal government authority unless it enacts legislation to
reverse the decisions.
Third, the Court declared some Indian reservations disestablished,
such as in South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,'7 ' or diminished, as in
Hagen v. Utah,'72 and redefined the term "Indian Country" by making
the astounding declaration that there was no Indian Country in Alaska in
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie.'73 Part and parcel of these cases was
the severe devaluation of the canons of construction for Indian treaties
and statutes.'74
Fourth, the Court's Indian taxation jurisprudence, based in part on a
balancing test developed in part by then-Justice Rehnquist in Moe v.
166. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
167. Duro, 495 U.S. at 688.
168. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197-98 (2004). See generally Nell Jessup Newton,
Commentary, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109 (1992);
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation That Overturned It: A Power Play of
Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767 (1993).
169. After the Supreme Court decided Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (s99o),
Congress enacted new legislation specifically authorizing a tribe to prosecute Indian
members of a different tribe. That new statute, in permitting a tribe to bring certain tribal
prosecutions against nonmember Indians,... enlarges the tribes' own "'powers of self-
government' to include "the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and
affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians," including nonmembers.
Lara, 541 U.S. at t97-98 (emphases omitted) (citations omitted).
170. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (I978). The Court listed three areas in which
it recognized implicit divestiture:
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred
are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.
Thus, Indian tribes can no longer freely alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy. They
cannot enter into direct commercial or governmental relations with foreign nations. And, as
we have recently held [in Oliphant], they cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts.
Id. (citations omitted).
171. 522 U.S. 329 (998).
172. 510 U.S. 399,421-22 (994).
173. 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998). For a powerful dissection of Venetie, see Carpenter, supra note 59.
174. See, e.g., Hagen, 510 U.S. at 424 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Although the majority purports
to apply these canons in principle, it ignores them in practice, resolving every ambiguity in the
statutory language, legislative history, and surrounding circumstances in favor of the State and
imputing to Congress, where no clear evidence of congressional intent exists, an intent to diminish the
Uintah Valley Reservation." (citation omitted)).
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Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,'75
became a muddled mess as the Court, from the point of view of tribal
interests, interpreted any factor as against the tribal interests. In this
area, the Court looks carefully for hints that tribal interests are
"market[ing] the exemption. '76 Whenever the Court sniffs this intent,
the tribal interests do not succeed.
77
Fifth, the Court held in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation that
equitable defenses applied in cases where Indian tribes or the United
States made claims related to historical treaty rights or land
dispossession.78 Since that decision, and a lower court decision dismissing
long-standing and powerful Indian land claims in New York state,'
79
many Indian treaty claims may be subject to dismissal on the basis of
equitable defenses. With one casual opinion in a tax case, the Court may
have changed the entire face of federal Indian law, adopting a rule that it
had been rejecting on a consistent basis for several decades.' 8
In short, the last twenty years have seen the Rehnquist Court go out
of its way to roll back federal Indian law jurisprudence, creating a new
jurisprudence that benefits states, local governments, and private
property owners that come into contact with tribal interests.
III. REVISITING THE INDIAN CASES
This Article offers an argument that perhaps it is now time to
recognize that the field of federal Indian law as argued before the
Supreme Court is dead. Traditional scholarship and advocacy has failed
to persuade the Court that its Indian cases should be decided in a
different way. Perhaps at one time, the Court agreed to hear Indian cases
on their own merits, but with the Court's shrinking docket, that might no
longer be the case. This Article proposes to look at the Indian law
decisions of the Rehnquist Court (and now the Roberts Court) with an
eye toward finding broader constitutional and pragmatic concerns that
interest the Court.
A. THE SHRINKING SUPREME COURT DOCKET
Chief Justice Rehnquist's leadership was almost without precedent
175. 425 U.S. 463, 480 (1976). For a discussion of Moe, see BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 29, at
189-96.
176. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, I55
(1980).
177. See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); Dep't of Taxation
& Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994).
178. 544 U.S. 197, 217-20 (2005).
179. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273-80 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 2022 (2006); see also Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. o5 -CV-2887, 2006 WL 3501O99
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006).
18o. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 253 n.27 (1985).
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in the history of the Supreme Court. There can be no serious doubt that
he brought a great deal of stability and legitimacy to a Court shaken by
the erratic leadership of Chief Justice Burger. One of the salient features
of the Rehnquist Court was the decline in the Court's docket. In the final
Term of the Burger Court, the Court heard and decided 159 cases.' By
the end of the Rehnquist Court, the Court heard and decided only about
eighty cases in the 2004 Term."'
The Court's smaller docket is loaded with cases required to resolve a
split in authority between jurisdictions, part of its oversight power over
federal courts, and a few significant constitutional law cases that attract
the Court's interest.' According to Judge Posner, there tends to be one
kind of case the Court now hears-"rule-imposing decisions" in which
the Court attempts to "tidy up a field by announcing a crisp rule or
standard."' 8' Professor Schauer argues in turn that while the Court's
ability to decide cases as it chooses remains viable, the Court's actual
"agenda" (if it can be called that) was far from "the public's major issues
of concern [and] the nation's first-order policy decisions.' , s8 While at one
time, Judge Posner posits, when the lower courts decided fewer cases, the
Court could serve in a supervisory position over the lower courts,'
"[t]he Court has long emphasized that it is not in the business of
correcting the errors of lower courts."' 87 Of course, these analyses beg the
question-why does the Court grant certiorari in the cases it does?
Most commentators and studies suggest that an important
constitutional concern drives the Court to vote to grant certiorari in
many cases."8 Professors George and Solimine's study of the Court's
decisions to grant certiorari in cases decided by the federal courts of
appeals sitting en banc affirmed their hypothesis that a conservative
Supreme Court is more likely to hear liberal civil rights decisions by
lower courts.'" Another study hypothesized and then concluded that
18i. See The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Leading Cases, supra note 62, at 311.
182. The Supreme Court, 2004 Term- The Statistics, supra note 62, at 430.
183. See generally Posner, supra note 9; Frederic Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-
Foreword: The Court's Agenda -And the Nation's, 12o HARV. L. REV. 4 (2006).
184. Posner, supra note 9, at 37.
i85. Schauer, supra note 183, at 31-32.
186. See Posner, supra note 9, at 35.
187. Id. at 37.
i88. See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 260 (I991); Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme
Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 408 (2002); Tracey E. George & Michael
E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SuP. Cr.
ECON. REV. 171, 197-98 (2001): Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction:
Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING III (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963); cf LAURENCE BAUM,
JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 156 (2006) (discussing "issue
salience"); See generally SuP. CT. R. Io ("Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari").
i89. See George & Solimine, supra note I88. at 198 ("And our finding that the conservative
HeinOnline -- 59 Hastings L.J. 603 2007-2008
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
"[b]ecause Congress cannot easily override constitutional decisions,...
the Justices will accept a higher proportion of constitutional cases, as
opposed to statutory ones."'" The same commentators believed that
[i]n the agenda-setting context, [the Court's] strategizing would take
the form of opting out of a statutory mode and into a constitutional
one, either by (I) rejecting a petition that requires [it] to interpret a
federal act, in favor of one that raises constitutional questions; or (2)
focusing on constitutional claims contained in a petition, rather than on
those of a statutory nature.'9'
Moreover, the Court may be in a position to "create constitutional rules
that are extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to
override" because of its certiorari power."'
What this seems to suggest is that the Court likely is not going to
accept an appeal on an Indian law matter unless there is a circuit split.'93
It would seem that federal Indian law on its own does not rise to the level
of importance or significance - as defined by legal and political elites - to
justify taking up space on the Court's docket. Even before the Rehnquist
Court began to limit the Court's docket, the Justices famously denigrated
the importance (to them) of the Indian cases.'94 Moreover, the unusual
character of the Indian cases -generating a significant amount of
confusion amongst those who are not experienced in the field-would
seem to compel the Court to stay away.' Finally, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist Court was much more likely to review liberal circuit rulings is consistent with the attitudinal
model and with the strategic account of high court agenda-setting.").
19o. Epstein et al., supra note 188, at 395.
191. Id. at 408 (emphasis omitted).
192. Id. at 430.
193. See, e.g., BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 127 S. Ct. 637, 643 (2006); Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt,
543 U.S. 631 , 636 (2005); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198-99 (2004); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507
U.S. 99, 101-02 (1993); cf. C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 410-
1s (2oo); Hagen v. Utah, 5io U.S. 399,408-09 (1994).
194. See BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 57-58
(979) (reporting that Justice Harlan referred to Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970), as a
"peewee" case); id. at 359 (reporting that Justice Brennan referred to United States v. Antoine, 420
U.S. 194 (977), as a "chickenshit" case); see also PERRY, supra note 188, at 262 (quoting a Supreme
Court Justice as saying, "The junior justices always get the crud. As a junior justice, I had my share of
Indian cases"); Neil M. Richards, The Supreme Court Justice's "Boring" Cases, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 401,
403 (2ooi) (quoting Justice Brennan's view of Antoine). But cf. PERRY, supra note 188, at 262 (quoting
a Supreme Court Justice as saying, "Actually, I think the Indian cases are kind of fascinating. It goes
into history and you learn about it, and the way we abused some of the Indians, we, that is the U.S.
government").
195. The words of one former Supreme Court clerk could support this theory:
As a former Supreme Court law clerk, allow me to speculate on what would have happened
had Justice Souter asked his law clerks for help in finding out about tribal courts. (I do not
know if he asked this question.) When I was a clerk, in 1979-8o, our best research tools
were the excellent research librarians of the Supreme Court library. If asked by my justice,
Thurgood Marshall, to find out all I could about tribal courts-a subject about which I knew
nothing-I would have turned over the inquiry to one of them. In a few days, I would have
received whatever she or he could locate in the Supreme Court library, the Library of
Congress, and wherever else materials could be found. There is no way even to guess what
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Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor having been replaced by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, the personal interest in Indian law of those
departed "Westerners" would seem to portend a further decline in
Indian law certiorari grants.' 9 In relative terms, these cases are rare and
affect few people. Only about a quarter of law schools even offer Indian
Law as a class.'97 A limited number of law professors know enough about
Indian law to be able to discuss the issues in the field with any
competence. Every Indian lawyer has an anecdote about a law professor
dismissing an Indian law case as being the exception to the rule not
worth discussing.
And yet the Court always accepts more Indian cases for review than
the field would appear to justify given the Court's limited interest in
Indian affairs.' Perhaps this is explained by the fact that the Supreme
Court's opportunity to make law, as a matter of common law, exists only
in admiralty law and federal Indian law." If the Court's current caseload
of about eighty cases holds in the Roberts Court, then if the Court
accepts two Indian law cases a year,"' 2.5% of its docket will continue to
be Indian law-related. In the 2006 Term, the Court decided two cases
involving tribal interests."2 What attracts the Court to federal Indian
law?
those materials would include. Today, a quarter-century after I was a law clerk, one would
speculate that the clerks would also take advantage of computer-assisted research. For
example, it would seem likely that they would search for "tribal court" using one or more
Internet search engines. And it would be beyond the scope of anyone's imagination what
might result from such searches. The task of separating the small amount of wheat from the
vast array of chaff would initially fall upon the clerks, who would almost certainly have no
expertise to bring to bear.
Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in Federal Indian
Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649,665 (2006).
196. See PERRY, supra note 188, at 261 ("And from a Westerner [Supreme Court Justice]: 'We now
have three Westerners [Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor] and we are very
concerned about Western water rights and Indian cases."').
197. See Gloria Valencia-Weber & Sherri Nicole Thomas, When the State Bar Exam Embraces
Indian Law: Teaching Experiences and Observations, 82 N.D. L. REV. 741, 745-46 (2oo6).
198. Cf. Brief of the University of Michigan Asian Pacific American Law Students Ass'n et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at Io, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241),
reprinted in 1o MICH. J. GENDER & L. 7, 14 (2003).
199. See, e.g., Getches, supra note 37, at 292 n.lo9 ("From 1958 to 2ooo, about 2.4% (121 of 4,853
cases) of the Court's total decisions on the merits were Indian cases. In the Rehnquist Court (1986-
2000 Terms), about 2.7% (41 of 1,51o cases) of the decisions have been in Indian cases. The average
number of Indian cases decided has dropped in recent years, but the percentage of Indian cases has
remained the same because the overall number of cases decided by the Court has fallen drastically.");
see also id. at 292-93.
200. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-23, at 157 (2d ed. 1988) (noting
that the Constitution authorizes the Court to make federal common law where "the usual federalism
concerns are not relevant," such as admiralty). The Author thanks Joe Singer for raising this point.
201. From 1953 to 2000, the Court decided an average of 1.9 Indian law cases per year. See BAIRD,
supra note 5, at io5.
202. See BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 127 S. Ct. 637, 643 (2006); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S.
Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007).
HeinOnline -- 59 Hastings L.J. 605 2007-2008
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
B. BROADER CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS AT PLAY
While the Court will grant certiorari to resolve circuit splits, those
cases do not cover the entirety of the Court's Indian law caseload. 3 This
Article argues that most Indian law cases reach the Court because there
is a constitutional issue embedded in the case that attracts the Court's
attention. This Article will refer to these issues as "constitutional
concerns." This Article further argues that while the Court may decide
concomitant federal Indian law issues as part of the overall decision, the
constitutional concern is what drives the Court, not the Indian law
questions. As a result, because the constitutional concern is far more
important to the Court than the Indian law questions, the Court decides
the Indian law questions in line with the broader constitutional concern.
Only after deciding the constitutional concern does the Court turn to the
remainder of the case-the Indian law portion-that also must be
decided. It is in these circumstances that the Indian law doctrines, far less
salient to the Court and therefore far more malleable, become more
confused and even, as Professor Frickey argued, "ruthlesslypragmatic.'24
All things must start at the beginning, so we first turn to the
Marshall Trilogy. Consider Worcester v. Georgia,5  the critical
foundational case of federal Indian law described at the beginning of this
Article. Justice Breyer has spoken recently about this case.2°6 Although
203. For example, several Indian law cases in recent Terms did not reach the Court because of a
split in authority, but for some other reason. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S.
95 (2005); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Inyo County v. Paiute-
Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Indian Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003); Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2ooi); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v.
Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2oo); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2ooo). Two other cases, Department of
the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (20o1), and South Florida Water
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe ofIndians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004), while not Indian law cases per
se, involved tribal interests and could be included in this listing.
204. Frickey, supra note 12, at 460; see also id. at 436 (discussing the Court's "ruthless
pragmatism").
205. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (r832).
206. See Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections of a Junior Justice, 54 DRicE L. REV. 7, 8-9 (2005)
[hereinafter Breyer, Reflections]; Stephen Breyer, The Legal Profession and Public Service, 57 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403, 413-14 (2ooo). Justice Breyer's remarks are worth reprinting here:
Consider an important case-one that is often forgotten in courses on constitutional law-
from 1832 called Worcester v. Georgia. There was a tribe of Indians, the Cherokees, who,
under a treaty with the United States, had land in northern Georgia. Now, this tribe had
given up hunting and fishing for better or for worse. They were farmers, they had an
alphabet, they even had a constitution. Unfortunately for them they found gold. I say
unfortunately because the Georgians then took the land. They simply marched in and took
it over. They paid no attention to the treaty. They did pay attention to the gold.
Now as I said this particular tribe of Indians was pretty civilized. So what did they do?
They did what any civilized American would do; they hired a lawyer. The lawyer was the
best lawyer of his day, Willard Wirt, former Attorney General of the United States, and he
said, "We are going to bring a lawsuit and we are going to fight it all the way to the
Supreme Court." In fact, they brought two.
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Justice Breyer is one of few Justices to have visited Indian Country to
become more aware of the conditions on the ground,2" it is doubtful that
he incorporated Worcester into his public speeches for that reason.
Worcester is not an Indian law case. Before hearing Worcester, the State
of Georgia had defied a Supreme Court order staying the execution of a
Cherokee man by the state for murder-they executed the man almost as
soon as they received the order staying the execution.2" Strong
circumstantial evidence supports the notion that the Court must have
had Georgia's defiance in mind when they decided Worcester."0 In
Worcester, Georgia had convicted four missionaries, and sentenced them
to several years of hard labor, for violating a state law that prohibited
In the first, called Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, they simply sued Georgia, and the
Supreme Court eventually found a reason not to hear it. The Court said this is a matter
beyond our capability. But then the Georgians passed a law making it a crime to go on the
Indian Reservation without the permission of the Georgia legislature. Some missionaries
did go on the reservation. A missionary called Worcester was arrested. He was in jail and he
brought a lawsuit, in habeas corpus or the equivalent, and said, "I cannot be held here
because this land belongs to the Indians, not the Georgians, so Georgia law does not apply."
There was no way for the Supreme Court to avoid that. Here is a person, he is held in
prison, he says I am not held correctly under the law because there is no law of Georgia that
applies, and he asks the Court to order his release. After a lot of procedural detail, which I
will spare you, he got to the Court and the Court decided the case. The Court held that he
was right, the land belonged to the Indians. In fact, the Court said the Georgians had no
basis at all for being there. That is the end of the matter. Release Worcester. Give the land
back to the Indians.
The first thing the Georgia legislature did was pass a law that said anyone who comes to
Georgia to enforce this ruling of the Supreme Court will be hanged. Andrew Jackson,
President of the United States, supposedly said (and he said enough such things that it is
probably true): "John Marshall, the Chief Justice, has made his decision. Now let him
enforce it." Nobody did a thing.
But then North Carolina, thinking this rather a good idea, said, "We will not give the
United States customs duties that we owe them because we prefer to keep them." Andrew
Jackson woke up to the problem and he ended up saying to the governor of Georgia, "You
must release Worcester." They had a negotiation and Worcester was let out of jail.
But what about the land-the land that the Supreme Court of the United States had said
belongs to the Cherokees, not to the Georgians? The President sent troops to Georgia. But
did he send them to enforce the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States? No. He
sent troops to evict the Indians. They walked along what is historically known as the Trail of
Tears, to Oklahoma, where their descendants live to this day.
Breyer, Reflections, supra, at 8-9.
207. See Danelle J. Daughtery, Children Are Sacred: Looking Beyond Best Interests of the Child to
Establish Effective Tribal-State Cooperative Child Support Advocacy Agreements in South Dakota, 47
S.D. L. REV. 282, 297 n.133 (2002) (describing Justices Breyer and O'Connor's visit to several tribal
courts); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Same-Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution, 61 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 53, 68 n.i29 (2006) (referencing Bruce Bothelo, who, as Attorney General for the State of
Alaska, hired John G. Roberts to represent Alaska in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government, 520 U.S. 522 (1998), and brought him to visit an isolated Alaskan Native village prior to
the Supreme Court argument). See generally Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third
Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. s (1997).
2o8. See GARRISON, supra note 18; see also Georgia v. Tassels, i Dud. 229 (Ga. 1830).
2o9. See Fletcher, supra note 91, at 643-44; cf Breyer, Reflections, supra note 206, at 9 (noting that
President Jackson, an ardent states' rights advocate, convinced southern states to comply with federal
HeinOnline -- 59 Hastings L.J. 607 2007-2008
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
white men from setting foot in Cherokee Nation territory."' The law,
part of a whole series of laws aimed at destroying the Cherokee Nation
as a viable political presence in Georgia,"' violated federal treaties
between the federal government and the Cherokee Nation. ' The case
had powerful implications for federal Indian law, but those concerns
were secondary to the broader constitutional concerns of the supremacy
of federal law over conflicting state law and the question of the
enforceability of Supreme Court mandates.
Compare Worcester to the previous case in the Marshall trilogy,
decided only a year before, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia."3 In that case,
one member of the Court argued that Indians were worthless savages
and Indian tribes were not viable political entities. 4 Another Justice,
following Chief Justice Marshall's lead opinion, voted on narrower
grounds but agreed that Indians and Indian tribes were weak and
dependent.215 The Marshall Court was badly fractured over the case, a
function of the declining influence of the aging Chief Justice and the
increasing hostility toward federal authority from the newer appointees
to the Court.216 But a year later, because of the powerful and dangerous
potential of the State of Georgia's defiance of federal law in Worcester,
the Court issued a dramatic reversal of its position on tribal interests. 17
That reversal did not derive from a newfound appreciation of the plight
of the Cherokee Nation at all. Perhaps that reversal happened because
the Court began to understand the implications of state defiance of
federal law that was beginning to happen in the South. Indian law
scholars and advocates take from Worcester that the Court had affirmed
the separate character of tribal sovereignty and the exclusion of state law
from Indian Country, but perhaps the bigger question was whether state
legislatures could override federal law."'
A more acute pattern-with the Court responding to broader
210. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 537-41.
211. See Joseph C. Burke, supra note 30, at 503; Vine Deloria, Jr., Conquest Masquerading as Law,
in UNLEARNING THE LANGUAGE OF CONQUEST: SCHOLARS EXPOSE ANTI-INDIANISM IN AMERICA 94, 98
(Wahinkpe Topa (Four Arrows) ed., 2006).
212. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 56o.
213. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831).
214. See id. at 25 (Johnson, J., concurring) (referring to the Cherokee Nation as a "petty kraal of
Indians").
215. Id. at 40 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
216. See CURRIE, supra note 29, at 195-96.
217. See R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 87 (1968); JEFFREY
ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA 66-67 (2006).
218. See Breyer, Reflections, supra note 206, at 9; Burke, supra note 29, at 53o; Gerald N.
Magiococca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v. Georgia and Dred Scott, 63 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 487, 550 (2002); Rennard Strickland & William M. Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls:
Reflections on Indian Law and Policy, the Cherokee Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme Court
Victories, 47 OKLA. L. REV. III, 116-17 (994).
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constitutional concerns in its Indian cases-corresponds to some extent
with the appointment of Justice Rehnquist to the Supreme Court in
1972.
i. Eleventh Amendment State Sovereign Immunity - Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak (i99i), Seminole Tribe v. Florida
(1996), and Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe (1997)
Many, if not most, Indian law cases arise out of disputes between
Indian tribes and states, with taxation,"' regulatory jurisdiction,"2 '
economic development,222 and the increasing encroachment of state
authority within Indian Country 3 being the primary sources of
antipathy. However, the Court often never reaches the merits, declaring
that it has no jurisdiction because the state sovereign has not waived its
sovereign immunity from suit, a result it has reached three times in the
last two decades.224 The Court has also held in several cases that Indian
tribes possess equivalent immunity from suit.25
In this line of cases, the Court's primary constitutional concern is not
tribal sovereignty or Indian rights, but clarity in its Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence."' The Rehnquist Court articulated a very robust sovereign
immunity for states and placed the foundation of that immunity in the
Eleventh Amendment.227 But neither the text of the Constitution nor the
Eleventh Amendment offer express authority for state sovereign
immunity, forcing the Court to rely upon the history of the Eleventh
Amendment's ratification and even extratextual, preconstitutional
259. See generally JESSE CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES -COMMENTS -QUESTIONS
1592 (IOth ed. 2006).
220. See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2004); Alaska v. Native Viii. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S.
520 (1998); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (I995); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac &
Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 5o5 (1991); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
221. See, e.g., City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197; Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172 (1999); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251 (1992); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); New Mexico
v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
222. See, e.g., Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95; County of Yakima, 502 U.S. 251; Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202.
223. See, e.g., Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95; Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Negonsott v. Samuels,
507 U.S. 99 (1993); County of Yakima, 502 U.S. 25i; Cotton Petroleum Corp., 490 U.S. 163; Colville
Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134.
224. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (I997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (t9901).
225. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754-59 (1998); Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. at 509-I 1; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (I978).
226. See, e.g., Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 777 ("We are asked once again to mark the boundaries of
state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.").
227. See generally MARK TUSHNET, A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 51-55 (2004); LaVelle, supra
note 53, at 867; Merrill, supra note I6, at 586.
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notions of state sovereignty principles. The Court's reasoning in these
cases may have contributed to its cases holding that Indian tribes also
possess a robust sovereign immunity."9
Each of the three cases discussed here involved critical questions of
federal Indian law for which the Supreme Court refused to allow an
answer by disclaiming the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary or the
power of Congress-or by ignoring the question. In Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak,3° the State of Alaska's legislature enacted a law
providing annual oil revenue-sharing payments to Native village
governments. 3 ' Acting upon the advice of the state attorney general, the
legislature then amended the statute to include all unincorporated local
governments, reducing the amount of revenue sharing available to each
Native village. 3' The Native Villages of Noatak and Circle Village
brought suit against the state seeking the original amount promised by
the legislature. 33 Seminole Tribe v. Florida'34 involved the enforcement
provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which authorized
Indian tribes to sue States for refusing to negotiate casino-style gaming
compacts in good faith.3 And Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,,6
involved the question of whether the banks and submerged lands of Lake
Coeur d'Alene were owned by the Coeur d'Alene Tribe or the State of
Idaho,'37 requiring an interpretation of an executive order that defined
the boundaries of the Tribe's reservation. None of these cases reached a
decision on the merits due to the Court's interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment and refusal to apply the doctrine of Ex parte Young.23
228. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,322-23 (934) ("Manifestly, we cannot
rest with a mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the
Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States."); cf. John F.
Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 1 13 YALE L.J.
1663, 1725-28 (2004) (discussing Principality of Monaco). See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 463 (2000) ("The question
of how we are to ground the Constitution is preconstitutional and extraconstitutional, and so the
question of how we are to understand the Constitution is likewise preconstitutional and
extraconstitutional.").
229. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782 ("We have repeatedly held that Indian tribes enjoy immunity
against suits by States ... as it would be absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity in a
convention to which they were not even parties.").
230. 501 U.S. 775 (991).
231. See id. at 777-78.
232. See id. at 778.
233. See id.
234. 517 U.S. 44 (I996).
235. See 25 U.S.C. § 271o(d) (2000); id. at 48-52; KATHRYN R.L. RAND & STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT,
INDIAN GAMING LAW AND POLICY 91-94 (2oo6); G. WILLIAM RICE, TRIBAL GOVERNMENTAL GAMING
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 311-35 (2oo6).
236. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
237. See id. at 264-65.
238. See id. at 268 ("Were we to abandon our understanding of the Eleventh Amendment as
reflecting a broader principle of sovereign immunity, the Tribe's suit... might proceed."); id. at 281
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While these cases reached the Supreme Court styled as federal
Indian law cases, in actuality none of them were Indian law cases.
Perhaps of all the cases discussed in this Article, Seminole Tribe is the
most obvious example of a major Indian law-related fact and legal
pattern hijacked by the Supreme Court's interest in deciding important
constitutional concerns. The critical legal question identified by Chief
Justice Rehnquist was "whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid
exercise of power,' 239 in its attempt to waive state sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment. In that case, Congress had attempted
to exercise its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause.24 Rather
than delve into the Court's precedents about the scope of congressional
authority under the Indian Commerce Clause or even the Framers' views
about the Clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion offered no
discussion whatsoever about congressional authority under the Clause.
Instead, the opinion focused on precedents (and some legal history)
relating to the Interstate Commerce Clause, first noting that the Court
had recognized congressional authority to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity in only two circumstances-in accordance with
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and in accordance with the
Interstate Commerce Clause.24 ' The opinion glossed over congressional
authority under the Indian Commerce Clause, treating that rich and
varied history as all but irrelevant,242 choosing instead to focus on the
lone Interstate Commerce Clause case that had recognized congressional
authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity-Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.243 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion overruled that case,
attacking the rationale of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion on
numerous grounds. 44 At that point, given that the Court denied Congress
authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity (for that Clause was one conceivable source of
("[T]his suit, we decide, falls on the Eleventh Amendment side of the line [of the Ex parte Young
doctrine], and Idaho's sovereign immunity controls." (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (19o8)));
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 ("We hold that . . . the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant
Congress [the power to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity] .... We further
hold that the doctrine of Ex parte Young... may not be used to enforce [the gaming act] against a
state official."); Blatchford, 5o U.S. at 782 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a
state by an Indian tribe). The dispute over Lake Coeur d'Alene did reach resolution (and in the
Tribe's favor) after the United States intervened on behalf of the Tribe. See Idaho v. United States,
533 U.S. 262 (2001).
239. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
240. See id. at 6o.
241. See id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 (1976) (Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment)); id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. i, i9 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(Interstate Commerce Clause)).
242. See id. at 6o-6i.
243. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
244. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63-73.
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congressional authority to deal with Indian gaming), the logical next
question would be whether the Indian Commerce Clause supplied
Congress that authority.
Put simply, the Court refused to analyze that question. The Court
did conclude (without citation or analysis) that "[i]f anything, the Indian
Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the
States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce
Clause." '245 But then the Court refused to disclose just how much or what
kind of authority Congress had under the Indian Commerce Clause vis-A-
vis the Eleventh Amendment, asserting: "[T]he plurality opinion in
Union Gas allows no principled distinction between the Indian
Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. ' ,, 6 This is a
classic non sequitur.
If the Court were serious about focusing on the Indian Commerce
Clause instead of overruling an irrelevant precedent, it could have
engaged in a serious analysis of the scope of congressional power under
the Indian Commerce Clause. A quick review of the Constitutional
Convention provides evidence that the Indian Commerce Clause should
be interpreted in a manner different than both the Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Clauses-the Framers drafted the Indian Commerce Clause
for different reasons than the other two Commerce Clauses"7 and,
perhaps as a result, added the Clause to the Constitution much later in
the ConventionY 8
The provision for regulation of commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states had been published by the committee of detail
two weeks, and definitely approved by the convention two days, before
the subject of the Indian trade was introduced on the floor of the
convention. It was not until several days later that the latter reported out
of committee, still encumbered with some of the qualifications attached
to it in the articles; and less than two weeks before the close of the
convention that it was finally incorporated with the rest of the Commerce
Clause and approved in the form with which we are familiar. By this
245. Id. at 62; see also id. ("This is clear enough from the fact that the States still exercise some
authority over interstate trade but have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce
and Indian tribes.").
246. Id. at 63.
247. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in
Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 467-68 (1941). Professor Abel focused on a notorious
proviso reserving some state authority in the Indian Affairs Clause of the Articles of Confederation
that so infuriated James Madison. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 269 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., i961) (referring to the proviso as "absolutely incomprehensible"); I RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (James Madison) (Max Farrand rev. ed., 1937) (Yale University
Press 1966) ("By the federal articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to [Congress]. Yet in
several instances, the States have entered into treaties & wars with them.").
248. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 247, at 324 (James Madison).
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time, the larger part of the discussion in the federal convention relative
to commercial regulations was over, and in that which did take place
later there is no language relating even remotely to Indian trade. 49
Professor Abel, after listing the evidence, concluded: "Whatever
regulation of commerce might mean in connection with transactions with
the Indians, it was so distinct and specialized a subject as to afford no
basis for argument as to the meaning of the rest of the clause.' 5
Moreover, the Framers intended that Congress's authority over Indian
Commerce extend beyond mere "commerce." As Professor Robert Stern
argued, the Framers intended the Constitution to serve as a "fix" on the
problem of the Articles of Confederation, which had allowed the states
to muddy the waters of federal Indian affairs policy.25' Stern asserted that
"the whole spirit of the proceedings indicates that ... the draughtsmen
meant commerce to have a broad meaning with relation to the
Indians. 25 In fact, Stern acknowledged that "[t]he exigencies of the time
may have called for a more complete system of regulating affairs with the
Indians than of controlling commerce among the states." 53
Unfortunately, no party to the matter and not even any of the numerous
amici noted this important historical information.
In short, Seminole Tribe's outcome-and the fate of an important
provision in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act-rested with the Court's
treatment of a case interpreting the Interstate Commerce Clause, not the
Indian Commerce Clause.
In a similar vein, the Court in Blatchford and in Coeur d'Alene Tribe
focused on two areas related to Eleventh Amendment immunity: (i) the
requirement that Congress must express its power to abrogate sovereign
immunity "by a clear legislative statement";2 54 and (2) the Ex parte Young
"exception" to sovereign immunity."' In Blatchford, the tribal interests
had argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1362, recognizing federal subject matter
jurisdiction over claims brought by Indian tribes, served as a waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity., 6 In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Tribe
sued officials of the State of Idaho under Ex parte Young, asserting that
their assertion of state jurisdiction over the disputed territory constituted
"an ongoing violation of its property rights in contravention of federal
249. Abel, supra note 247, at 467-68.
250. Id. at 468.
251. See Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1335, 1342 (1934).
252. Id. at 1342.
253. Id. at 1342 n.27.
254. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (i99i) (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989)).
255. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281-82 (I99I); see also Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (rejecting the potential application of Ex pane Young).
256. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786.
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law and [sought] prospective injunctive relief. 257 The Court rejected the
Tribe's application to take advantage of the Ex parte Young exception
because to authorize the suit would constitute a de facto quiet title action
against the State itself.25 s As with Seminole Tribe, these cases offer little
or no discussion of foundational federal Indian law principles.259
2. Individual Civil Rights Claims-Morton v. Mancari (1975),
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978), Nevada v. Hicks (2ooT),
and Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop
Community of the Bishop Colony (2003)
Several alleged Indian law cases of the past three decades have
involved individual or tribal civil rights claims against the federal or state
government or their officials. While the underlying subject matter of
these cases had federal Indian law at their core, the Court's primary
concern in these cases appears to be the jurisprudence relating to the
liability of federal and state governments to civil rights claims under
§ 1983 and the Fifth Amendment. The four cases discussed in this
subpart split down the middle, with two major wins for tribal interests
(Morton v. Mancari 26 and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez26,), one major
loss (Nevada v. Hicks),262 and one split decision (Inyo County v. Paiute-
Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony), 63
although this discussion will focus on the portion of the Inyo County case
that the tribal interests lost.
Consider first Morton v. Mancari. In Mancari, non-Indian employees
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) challenged a federal regulation
awarding preferential treatment to American Indians in BIA
employment promotion and demotion decisions 64 The BIA's
employment preference complied with congressional policy first
articulated in the Indian Reorganization Act and extended in various
other congressional enactments.26 ' Most of the Court's attention focused
on the "'cardinal rule ... that repeals by implication are not favored.
' 266
The challengers argued that the 1972 statute banning employment
discrimination in most areas of the federal government had served to
257. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281.
258. See id. at 282.
259. To be fair, Justice Scalia's Blatchford opinion does offer a neat and tidy federal Indian law
syllogism: "But if the convention could not surrender the tribes' immunity for the benefit of the States,
we do not believe that it surrendered the States' immunity for the benefit of the tribes." Blatchford,
501 U.S. at 782.
260. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
261. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
262. 535 U.S. 533 (200).
263. 538 U.S. 701 (2003).
264. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 538.
265. See id. at 542-45 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 44-47, 274 (2000)).
266. Id. at 549-50 (quoting Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)) (alteration in
original).
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repeal the Indian preference policy.2 The Court noted that while federal
anti-discrimination policy had changed to favor federal employees,
Congress had bolstered federal policy in relation to Indian preference in
employment within months of the 1972 statute.268 The Court was able to
apply two of its canons of statutory construction: (I) that a specific
statute will control over a general statute; and (2) that two statutes that
are not irreconcilable should be interpreted to preserve both.27 The
Court held that the 1972 general prohibition on discrimination in federal
employment did not serve to repeal Congress's continued authorization
of Indian preference in employment in certain federal agencies. 2 ' This
holding of the Mancari Court-a non-federal Indian law issue-
continues to be the most important holding of the case, with numerous
Supreme Court decisions citing to this opinion."272
The Mancari Court also held that the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause did not bar the BIA from offering a preference in
employment to American Indians. 73 Relying on foundational federal
Indian law and policy, the Court noted that the Indian preference in
employment was an important element of modern federal Indian policy
that would seek to avoid the history of "overly paternalistic" Indian
policy.74 The Court focused on the plenary power of Congress to
effectuate Indian affairs policy, '75 as well as the serious problem of the
vulnerability of an entire title of the United States Code (Title 25-
Indians) should congressional legislation affecting Indians be classified as
race-based legislation. '76 In short, the Court held, Indian preferences
267. See id. at 547 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-i6(a)). A three-judge panel of the district court
had ruled on this basis in favor of the non-Indian challengers. See Mancari v. Morton, 359 F. Supp. 585,
590 (D.N.M. 1973).
268. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 548.
269. See id. at 550-51.
270. See id. at 551 (citing United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. i88, 198 (1939)).
271. See id. at 547-51.
272. See, e.g., Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 293 (2003); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 141-42 (20o1); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 109
(i99i); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,
281 (i981); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1978); Radzanower v. Touche Ross &
Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976); see also Karen Petroski, Comment, Retheorizing the Presumption
Against Implied Repeals, 92 CAL. L. REV. 487, 508 n.97 (2004) ("According to online citation services,
as of this Comment's publication date, around 8oo subsequent opinions cited Morton v. Mancari, most
for its holding regarding implied repeal.").
273. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553-55 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (954)). Importantly,
given the importance of the implied repeals portion of the case, the three-judge district court panel
never reached this question. See Mancari v. Morton, 359 F. Supp. 585, 591 (D.N.M. 1973).
274. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553.
275. See id. at 551-52 (citing U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause)).
276. See id. at 552-53 ("Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and
reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA, single out for special treatment a
constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical
relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination,
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were not race-based classifications, but classifications based on the
political status of Indians and Indian tribes, negating any equal
protection violation under the Fifth Amendment."7 But this holding can
be construed as more than a vindication of federal Indian policy favoring1 78
Indian people-in fact, as some scholars arguably have implied, the
Mancari Court's equal protection holding should be placed in the greater
context of the viability of the Boiling v. Sharpe holding that an Equal
Protection Clause should be implied by the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 79 Consider further that the Burger Court's prime
directive from the Nixon Administration, assuming such a directive was
persuasive to the individuals on the Burger Court, was to roll back or at
least contain the Warren Court's expansive reading of implied
constitutional rights.2O Perhaps Mancari was a place where some of the
Warren Court holdovers could agree with some of the Nixon
conservatives that the Bolling holding could be limited because the limit
benefited a discrete minority-American Indians. Surely, federal Indian
law played an important part in this decision, but it appears likely that
much more salient constitutional concerns were at play as well.
Consider next Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,"' perhaps the most
powerful Supreme Court precedent of the modern era favoring Indian
tribes. In Martinez, a female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo brought
suit on behalf of herself and her children under a provision in the Indian
Civil Rights Act requiring Indian tribes to guarantee the equal protection
of the law,8' The petitioner claimed that the Santa Clara membership
ordinance discriminated against her and her children on the basis of sex
because it granted membership status to children of male members of the
community and female nonmembers while simultaneously denying
membership to children of female members of the community and male
nonmembers."3 In rejecting the claim, the Martinez Court affirmed that
an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn
commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized." (citing Simmons v. Eagle
Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 8o8, 814 n.13 (E.D. Wash. 1965), affd, 384 U.S. 209 (1966))).
277. See id. at 553-54,554 n.24.
278. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of
Native Hawaiians, io6 YALE L.J. 537, 544-45, 545 n.33 (1996) (characterizing Mancari as an equal
protection case); Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, Iio HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1762 n.33 (1997) (questioning whether there is an equal
protection element to the Fifth Amendment); cf. L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The
Predicament of Tribes, 1o COLUM. L. REV. 702, 729 (2001) (arguing that Mancari's weakness is
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (997)).
279. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954).
280. See JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 23-25 (2OO7).
281. 436 U.S. 49(1978).
282. See id. at 51 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (20oo)).
283. See id.
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the Supreme Court would recognize the sovereign immunity of Indian
tribes from suit on the same basis as federal and state immunity."" The
Court held that the Indian Civil Rights Act, while a valid act of Congress
imposing rigorous duties on tribal government, 5 did not operate to
waive the immunity of Indian tribes from suit in federal court, noting
that congressional waivers of immunity from suit must be express, not
implied! While this holding has been critical to Indian tribes and serves
as a foundation of modem Indian law, it is important to note for our
purposes that the Court borrowed from non-Indian law sovereign
immunity cases in its reasoning,27 apparently bringing tribal sovereign
immunity cases into a sort of doctrinal consistency with federal and state
immunity cases.288 Nevertheless, this aspect of Martinez is a critical Indian
law holding.
Like Mancari, however, Martinez can be read as a case limiting the
kind of "judicial activism" linked with the Warren Court (garnering the
votes of some Nixon conservatives) that still upheld the rights of a
discrete minority (garnering the vote of some Warren Court holdovers).
As with Mancari and the doctrine of implied repeals, the proxy for this
unusual alignment could have been the Court's disfavor in recognizing an
implied private cause of action in a civil rights statute."" The Indian Civil
Rights Act's sole cause of action to enforce its provisions was the
authorization to petition for a writ of habeas corpus for those convicted
of a crime in tribal court."9 The Court noted that there were two critical
(and competing) purposes in the Act: "In addition to its objective of
strengthening the position of individual tribal members vis-A-vis the
tribe, Congress also intended to promote the well-established federal
'policy of furthering Indian self-government.' '' 9' The Court asserted that
congressional intent to further tribal self-government would be defeated
to some extent by opening the federal courts to individuals seeking to
enforce the Act,92 holding that Congress's failure to provide a general
cause of action was "deliberate. 93
There is no doubt that Justice Marshall's majority opinion offered a
284. See id. at 58.
285. The Court noted and the Pueblo conceded that Congress had plenary power to alter the
sovereign powers of Indian tribes. See id.
286. See id. (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (976)).
287. See id.
288. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 738 (999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (I999); Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996);
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (I98O); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare
v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,305 n.5 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
289. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 6o.
290. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2ooo).
291. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
292. See id. at 59-60, 63-64.
293. Id. at6i.
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substantial defense of tribal sovereignty, imputing, for example, in the
Indian Civil Rights Act a congressional intent to assist in the
development of tribal dispute resolution forums, including tribal courts."
The majority found this intent to exclude most cases from federal court
jurisdiction despite contradictory legislative history suggesting that
Congress intended for the Act to correct at least five pre-1968 federal
court cases denying a civil rights remedy to plaintiffs.95 This evidence
reveals a powerful recognition of tribal sovereignty and federal Indian
policy favoring tribal governments played an important role in the
Court's reasoning on one hand, but the Court still denied a federal forum
for individuals to vindicate their civil rights. It is possible to conclude that
while individual Justices may have voted in favor of the Pueblo out of
concern for tribal sovereignty, others may have voted in favor of the
Pueblo as a means to deny the creation of yet another implied cause of
action in a civil rights case.
The final two cases in this section concern the Court's § 1983
jurisprudence. Specifically, Nevada v. Hicks concerns the ability of
individuals to sue state law enforcement officials in tribal courts, 9 while
Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the
Bishop Colony concerns the standing of Indian tribes to bring § 1983
claims against state officials.297 In Hicks, a tribal member's on-reservation
home was the subject of a pair of search warrants issued by Nevada
courts (one of which had been domesticized in the reservation tribal
court), authorizing state officers to search for evidence that the tribal
member had taken a California bighorn sheep in violation of state law.
98
The tribal member, Floyd Hicks, brought suit in tribal court, claiming
that the state officers (and others, including tribal officers) had violated
his civil rights and sought relief under § I983.29 The Court rejected the
claims on the twin theories that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction
over the state officers under principles of federal Indian law and that the
tribal court could not have jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.3 ° Justice
O'Connor, concurring in the result, noted that state sovereign immunity
294. See id. at 59-60.
295. See Respondents' Brief at 15, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (978) (No. 76-682)
(citing S. Rep. No. 9o-841, at 9-IO (1967)). The five cases were Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal
Council, 272 F.2d 131 (ioth Cir. 1959), Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 932 (i959), Martinez v. S. Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (ioth Cir. 1957), cert denied, 356
U.S. 960 (1958), Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956), and Toledo v. Pueblo de
Jemez, i 19 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
296. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366-69 (2ooi).
297. Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Indian Cmty. of the Bishop Colony,
538 U.S. 701, 708-12 (2003).
298. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 356-57.
299. Id. at 357.
300. Id. at 357-69.
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principles should have controlled the outcome, asserting that the
majority's discussion of federal Indian law principles was unnecessary
and damaging to tribal sovereignty.30 ' In the context of this Article, which
alleges that the Court's members are more likely to vote in accordance
with important constitutional concerns and not federal Indian law
principles, Hicks is an important anomaly. Justice Scalia's majority
opinion begins with an analysis of federal Indian law principles-and, in
dramatic fashion, reworks those principles in broad strokes against tribal
interests.02 The opinion undermines the principle of federal Indian law
that state laws do not have (much) force in Indian Country by expanding
for the first time the so-called Montana rule into tribal reservation and
trust lands.3"3 Justice Scalia justified the unprecedented state law
intervention into Indian Country on the basis that state law enforcement
interests simply outweighed the tribe's interest in governing itself.3 4 The
majority's next point, that Congress never intended or authorized tribal
courts to assume jurisdiction over § 1983 claims,3 5 could have (and
should have) disposed of the issue without reference to federal Indian
law principles about the jurisdiction of Indian tribes or tribal courts. If a
tribal court could not assume jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim against a
state law enforcement officer, then that court would not be able to assert
it under federal Indian law, either. The Court could have remanded the
federal Indian law question back to the lower courts for a determination
of whether some independent federal Indian law principle would justify
or authorize the tribal court to take jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.
The Hicks opinion could have looked more like the short opinion in
Inyo County, which held that Indian tribes are not "persons" as defined
by § 1983.3  In Inyo County, the state had raided a tribal business
enterprise and confiscated employment records in accordance with a
state search warrant, but without tribal authorization.3" The Court
reached the unusual conclusion that, although the definitions of
"persons" under the Sherman Act and the False Claims Act allows states
and foreign nations to sue to vindicate rights under those statues,
§ 1983's definition of "person" does not include Indian tribes.3"8 The tribe
301. See id. at 397-401 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
302. See id. at 360-65 (majority opinion).
303. See id. at 361-62. Justice Ginsburg's short concurrence disputed the majority's conclusion that
the tribal or non-tribal character of the land was irrelevant. See id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(citing Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997)).
304. See id. at 363-64 (majority opinion).
305. See id. at 366-67.
306. Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Indian Cmty. of the Bishop Colony,
538 U.S. 701, 712 (2003).
307. Id. at 705.
308. See id. at 711-12. But see id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("It is demeaning
to Native American tribes to deny them the same access to a § 1983 remedy that is available to any
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had also relied upon the federal Indian law principle of tribal sovereign
immunity and other federal common law principles to avoid the search
warrant, issues the Court remanded."
Of the four cases discussed in this part, Inyo County, perhaps, is the
case that implicates federal Indian law principles the least. Each case,
however, could have been decided on grounds utterly unrelated to
federal Indian law. It is a strong possibility in each case that some
members of each Court (perhaps a significant plurality) signed on to a
majority opinion focused on federal Indian law principles because that
opinion also vindicated a non-Indian law-related constitutional concern
important to them. Consider that each of the four cases includes an
important element of what Professor Jed Rubenfeld refers to as the
Rehnquist Court's "anti-anti-discrimination agenda.""31 As Professor
Rubenfeld puts it, "[t]he anti-anti-discrimination agenda would be
especially hostile to claims that a person has been 'discriminated against'
when he has merely been asked to abide by the same laws everyone else
must.... The more recent cases, Hicks and Inyo County, fit this category,
with the Court implying that Indians and tribes are not special; that they
can and should seek to vindicate whatever rights they might have in some
other manner besides civil rights laws. Professor Rubenfeld identified
hostility from the Rehnquist Court toward "any other laws extending the
concept of discrimination beyond the confines that the Court itself has
laid down. 3.. The claims in Mancari and Martinez appear to fit this
category, with the Court refusing to find implied substantive rights or
causes of action in either the Fifth Amendment or the Indian Civil Rights
Act.
3. Indian Treaty Rights- Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n (1979)
Indian treaty rights cases form a significant portion of the core of
federal Indian law, but the foundational case discussed in this subpart
also demonstrates that non-Indian law-related constitutional concerns
drove the Court's decisions. In Washington v. Washington Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,"3 the Court affirmed the foundation of
the famous "Boldt decision" recognizing Indian treaty fishing rights in
other person whose constitutional rights are violated by persons acting under color of state law.").
309. Id. at 712 (majority opinion).
310. See RUBENFELD, supra note 24, at 176-79.
311. Id. at 176.
312. Id.
313. 443 U.S 658 (1979). For commentary on the case, please see RUSSEL L. BARSH, THE
WASHINGTON FISHING RIGHTS CONTROVERSY: AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE 77-103 (I979); FAY G. COHEN,
TREATIES ON TRIAL: THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS (1986);
and CHARLES F. WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK'S LANDING: A STORY OF SALMON, TREATIES, AND
THE INDIAN WAY (2000).
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the Puget Sound area."4 However, the case included a major question
relating to the granting of full faith and credit of federal court orders in
state courts,"' a question about the supremacy of federal law.' This case
can be seen as a rehash of Worcester. In this case, the culmination of
dozens of lawsuits and federal and state court decisions, the Court was
confronted with the fact that a state supreme court had interpreted a
treaty in ways that conflicted with federal court interpretations.
Moreover, lower state courts and state officials had a long history of
violating federal court orders throughout the larger dispute over treaty
fishing rights. Of course, this problem implicated the Court's supervisory
responsibility.317
314. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 44 3 U.S. at 684-85.
315. See Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 669 n.14 ("The impact of illegal regulation and of illegal
exclusionary tactics by non-Indians in large measure accounts for the decline of the Indian fisheries
during this century and renders that decline irrelevant to a determination of the fishing rights the
Indians assumed they were securing by initialing the treaties in the middle of the last century."
(citations omitted)); id. at 672 n.I9 ("[Tihe reason for our recent grant of certiorari on the question
remains because the state courts are.., on record as interpreting the treaties involved differently from
the federal courts." (citation omitted)); id. at 673 ("When Fisheries was ordered by the state courts to
abandon its attempt to promulgate and enforce regulations in compliance with the federal court's
decree-and when the Game Department simply refused to comply-the District Court entered a
series of orders enabling it, with the aid of the United States Attorney for the Western District of
Washington and various federal law enforcement agencies, directly to supervise those aspects of the
State's fisheries necessary to the preservation of treaty fishing rights."); id. at 674 ("Because of the
widespread defiance of the District Court's orders, this litigation has assumed unusual significance. We
granted certiorari in the state and federal cases to interpret this important treaty provision and thereby
to resolve the conflict between the state and federal courts regarding what, if any, right the Indians
have to a share of the fish, to address the implications of international regulation of the fisheries in the
area, and to remove any doubts about the federal court's power to enforce its orders.").
316. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I (requiring state courts to give full faith and credit to each other's
decisions); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (requiring state courts to give
full faith and credit to federal courts and vice versa).
317. Another case, United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), poses a question about
Congressional power to abrogate treaties with later-enacted legislation, see id. at 738 ("It is long
settled that 'the provisions of an act of Congress, passed in the exercise of its constitutional
authority,.., if clear and explicit, must be upheld by the courts, even in contravention of express
stipulations in an earlier treaty' with a foreign power." (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 720 (1893))) (alteration in original), despite the serious national worry that bald eagles and
other kinds of eagles were near extinction at the time. See Roberto Iraola, The Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act, 68 ALB. L. REV. 973, 974 & n.9 (2005).
One final case, Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), presents
a similar question about Executive power to abrogate treaties. See id. at 188-89 ("'The President's
power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution
itself."' (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952))); see also id. at
196 (describing means of interpreting foreign treaties). For background and commentary on this
important case, please see JAMES M. MCCLURKEN ET AL., FISH IN THE GREAT LAKES, WILD RICE AND
GAME IN ABUNDANCE: TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF MILLE LACS OJIBWE HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS
(2oo); Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for
Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. Io6i, 1102-03 (2005); Robert Laurence, Antipodean
Reflections on American Indian Law, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 533, 542-43 (2003); and The
Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Leading Cases, 113 HARv. L. REV. 200,389-99 (999).
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4. Religious Freedom-Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n (1988)
In the two major Indian religious freedom cases in the modern era,
tribal interests went down in humiliating defeat. In the first, Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,3Is the tribal interests
attempted to prevent the United States Forest Service from constructing
a road through an area in northern California sacred to the Yurok,
Karuk, and Tolowa Indians."9 Conceding that the construction of the
road would be "devastating" to the religion32° (but doubting that it would
"doom" the religion),32' Justice O'Connor's majority opinion focused on
two points. First, the land at issue was owned by the federal government
and the Court disfavored outsider attempts to control federal land
projects. 2 Second, the Lyng majority was concerned that the Court
would be forced to choose one religion over another,3 3 second-guess the
salience of religious belief,3 4 or interpret the religious tenets of
unfamiliar religions.3 5 The Court noted that its validation of the tribal
claim would result in a situation where "government . . . [would be]
required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires."3' 6 But
The constitutional concern in these cases has little to do with tribal interests. The Court's interest
was the extent of Congressional and Executive authority to abrogate treaties. The fact that they were
Indian treaties was all but irrelevant.
318. 485 U.S. 439 (I988).
319. See id. at 442-45.
320. Id. at 451 ("The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to doubt, that the
logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating effects on traditional
Indian religious practices. Those practices are intimately and inextricably bound up with the unique
features of the Chimney Rock area, which is known to the Indians as the 'high country.' Individual
practitioners use this area for personal spiritual development; some of their activities are believed to
be critically important in advancing the welfare of the Tribe, and indeed, of mankind itself. The
Indians use this area, as they have used it for a very long time, to conduct a wide variety of specific
rituals that aim to accomplish their religious goals. According to their beliefs, the rituals would not be
efficacious if conducted at other sites than the ones traditionally used, and too much disturbance of the
area's natural state would clearly render any meaningful continuation of traditional practices
impossible.").
321. Id. ("To be sure, the Indians themselves were far from unanimous in opposing the G-O
road,.., and it seems less than certain that construction of the road will be so disruptive that it will
doom their religion. Nevertheless, we can assume that the threat to the efficacy of at least some
religious practices is extremely grave.").
322. See id. at 453 ("Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, however, those
rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land."); id. at 452 ("The
First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public
programs.").
323. See id. at 457 ("We would accordingly be required to weigh the value of every religious belief
and practice that is said to be threatened by any government program.").
324. See id. at 449 ("This Court cannot determine the truth of the underlying beliefs that led to the
religious objections here ... and accordingly cannot weigh the adverse effects.., on the Indian
respondents.").
325. See id. at 457-58 ("In other words, the dissent's approach would require us to rule that some
religious adherents misunderstand their own religious beliefs.").
326. Id. at 452; see also id. ("A broad range of government activities-from social welfare
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foundational federal Indian law principles would have required the
Court to address the possibility that in the case of the California Indians,
the United States may have agreed via treaty that these specific Indian
religious practices or these Indian lands must be protected from federal
interference. That might have required the Court to address the sticky
question of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo3"' and the subsequent
unratified California Indian treaties of the i850s."2 This, of course, the
Court did not do. The difficult hypothetical questions that concerned
Justice O'Connor would not have arisen in this context, nor would this
case have constituted a precedent for any other kind of religious freedom
cases.
329
5. Reparations-City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation (2005)
In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,33 the Supreme Court
held that the "settled expectations" of non-Indian property owners and
state and local governments justified the application of equitable
defenses such as laches, impossibility, and acquiescence, to Indian claims
programs to foreign aid to conservation projects-will always be considered essential to the spiritual
well-being of some citizens, often on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. Others will find the
very same activities deeply offensive, and perhaps incompatible with their own search for spiritual
fulfillment and with the tenets of their religion.").
327. See generally Frederico M. Cheever, A New Approach to Spanish and Mexican Land Grants
and the Public Trust Doctrine: Defining the Property Interest Protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hildago, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1364 (1986); Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest. Property Rights,
Indian Treaties, and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201 (1996); Guadalupe T.
Luna, Legal Realism and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago: A Fractionalized Legal Template, 2005
Wis. L. REV. 519.
328. See Steve Talbot, California Indians, Genocide of, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN INDIAN
HISTORY 226, 230-31 (Bruce E. Johansen & Barry M. Pritzker eds. 2007) (discussing the eighteen "lost
treaties"); see also ROBERT F. HEIZER, EIGHTEEN UNRATIFIED TREATIES OF 1851-1852 BETWEEN THE
CALIFORNIA INDIANS AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (1972).
329. Another Indian religious freedom case, Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (199O),
appears to be a classic case of tribal interests being hijacked by the jurisprudential agenda of the Court
and by the social policy of the federal government. In Smith, two employees (who were members of
the Native American Church) of a private drug rehabilitation organization were fired for ingesting
peyote as a sacrament (a bad fact pattern if there ever was one). See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. After their
termination, they sought unemployment benefits but were denied because state law categorized the
use and possession of peyote as a crime. See id. at 876 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 763 P.2d 146,
148 (Or. 1988)). Justice Sealia's majority opinion extended the reach of Lyng, over Justice O'Connor's
objection, see id. at 892-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), by eviscerating a First
Amendment balancing test that required the Court to apply a form of strict scrutiny to governmental
programs that substantially burdened a religious practice. See id. at 882-89 (discussing Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). Congress reacted to the Smith decision by enacting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (997) (invalidating the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act). Moreover, the events in the case arose at the same time that the
Nation was engaged in the infamous "War on Drugs." See, e.g., Gun S., Inc. v. Brady, 711 F. Supp.
1054, 1056-57 (N.D. Ala. 1989). Given this confluence of non-Indian law related factors, the
petitioners in Smith had no chance.
330. 544 U.S. 197 (2oo5).
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to sovereignty.33' The Second Circuit then applied the broadest reading
of the reasoning of the Sherrill Court to dismiss Indian land claims on
appeal in which the Cayuga Indian Nation had won at the trial court
level over $200 million in damages and interest against the State of New
York and several of its political subdivisions.33 ' In other words, any older
claim to land, treaty rights, or sovereignty-no matter its merit-could
be subject to equitable defenses favoring non-Indian property or
governmental interests.
What is very interesting about City of Sherrill is the breadth of its
reasoning. Given the existence and potential of massive claims for
reparations winding their way through federal courts,333  Justice
Ginsburg's reasoning in City of Sherrill could apply with equal force to
non-Indian reparations claims in which any "settled" property interests
are at risk. The opinion serves, in some ways, as the legal implementation
of philosophical objections to ancient claims.334 City of Sherrill may be the
first shot off the bow in a larger reparations debate-and could be a
signal that massive reparations are not forthcoming from this Supreme
Court.
6. Remaining Post-1986 Cases
This pattern repeats in numerous other cases involving tribal
interests after 1986. Fifth Amendment takings drove the Court's
decisions in Hodel v. Irving and Babbitt v. Youpee that invalidated
attempts by Congress to remedy the serious problem of fractionating
heirships on Indian lands.335 The Court held that damage to private
property rights from the federal government's exercise of its navigational
servitude over riverbeds is not compensable under the Fifth Amendment
in United States v. Cherokee Nation.336 The contours of federal agency
discretion drove the Court's decisions in Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt,337
United States v. Navajo Nation,338 and Lincoln v. Vigil.339 State compliance
with the Fifteenth Amendment drove the Court's decision in Rice v.
331. See id. at 218-21. See generally Singer, supra note 26.
332. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 274 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2021 (2006).
333. See generally Burt Neuborne, Holocaust Reparations Litigation: Lessons for the Slavery
Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 615 (2003).
334. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights Claims of Indigenous Populations: The
View from the Common Law, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. I (1999); Samuel T. Morison, Prescriptive Justice and
the Weight of History, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1153 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, Redressing Historical
Injustice, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 135 (2002); Jeremy Waldron, Superceding Historical Injustice, 103 ETmcs
4(1992).
335. See Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 243-45 (1998); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715-18
(1987).
336. 48o U.S. 700,703-04 (1987).
337. 543 U.S. 631, 636-47 (2005).
338. 537 U.S. 532, 5o6-14 (2003).
339. 5o8 U.S. 182, 190-99 (1993).
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Cayetano. 4° The policy behind the Freedom of Information Act drove
Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n."'
Rejections of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine and the
argument that state taxes must be reasonably related to state services to
taxpayers drove Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico.42 The case
where the Court held that tribes cannot have criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers-Duro v. Reina-focused on congressional authority to
subject American citizens to criminal prosecution in jurisdictions that do
not provide American-style criminal procedure protections.343 Montana v.
Crow Tribe of Indians relied on the principle that nontaxpayers cannot
sue to recover the taxes paid by another.' Amoco Production Co. v.
Southern Ute Indian Tribe held that in federal land patents to private
landowners reserving federal rights to coal under the surface, the patents
granted rights to coal bed methane gas to the patentees and was not
reserved by federal law.345 Chickasaw Nation v. United States was a simple
statutory interpretation case involving the application of canons of tax
immunity interpretations. 46 South Florida Water Management District v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians held that the Clean Water Act reaches to
point sources that do not generate pollution.347 Note that all of the above
cases are losses for tribal interests.
There are several Indian law cases decided by the Court where it
appears that the outcome was decided through the application of Indian
law principles, but these cases are few and far between after the early
1990s and almost all of them are tax cases. Thirteen of these cases were
losses for tribal interests, 34s while five were wins.349
340. 528 U.S. 495,511-17 (2000).
341. 532 U.S. i, 8-i6 (2001).
342. 490 U.S. 163, 174-76, 189-91 (1989).
343. 490 U.S. 676,693-94 (990)-
344. 523 U.S. 696,713 (1998).
345. 526 U.S. 865,874-80 (i999).
346. 534 U.S. 84,86-91 (2ool).
347. 541 U.S. 95, 104-05 (2004) (construing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000)).
348. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); Atkinson Trading Co. v.
Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S.
411 (2ooi); Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32 (i999); Cass County v. Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998); Alaska v. Native Viii. of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
522 U.S. 520 (1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Strate v. A-I
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 6i
(1994); Hagen v. Utah, 5io U.S. 399 (1993); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Negonsott
v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
349. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); United States v. White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); Okla. Tax Comm'n v.
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (995); Okla. Tax Cornm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
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C. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SURVEY
The previous survey may lead to some conclusions that might
surprise observers of federal Indian law. As would be true with any
theory, it is impossible to prove with any certainty what motivates the
Justices in their voting preferences, but in several modern era cases that
commentators label "federal Indian law" cases, there are significant
alternative holdings or reasons unrelated to federal Indian law principles
that could be used to justify the decision. Moreover, as the years
advanced, it could be argued that the Court decided the cases less and
less on federal Indian law principles. Three of the six Indian law
decisions in the 2003 to 2005 Terms have no Indian law issues
whatsoever. ° In the last ten years, only one case arguably had no non-
Indian law components to it"' -and every other case (again, arguably)
had a non-Indian law issue that might have been dispositive of the entire
case. Take, for example, United States v. Navajo Nation,35 a case vilified
by commentators because the Court ruled that an apparent arbitrary
decision by the Secretary of the Interior (in favor of a personal friend's
client) was not precluded by federal statute.353 The Court's decision
rested in part on a preference for deferring to administrative agencies-
which perhaps could have been the crux of the entire decision.354 Or take
Nevada v. Hicks,355 a case ostensibly about the civil jurisdiction of tribal
courts, that could just as easily be characterized as a decision
vindicating the sovereign immunity of states and their officers in foreign
courts.357 Or Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop
Community of the Bishop Colony,"' a case about whether tribal
sovereign immunity can prevent a state government officer from raiding
a tribal casino facility to enforce a state civil law, which turned on
whether the tribe or any sovereign entity was a "person" under the
350. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espiria Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006);
Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005); Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. at 95.
351. See Leech Lake Band, 524 U.S. 103.
352. 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
353. See, e.g., Supreme Court Deals a Win and a Lesson, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 14, 2003,
http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1O47662515. For a more nuanced view, see Raymond
Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an Age of Indian Self-Determination: An Epitaph for a Dying
Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369, 390-97 (2O03), and Raymond Cross, Reconsidering the Original
Founding of Indian and Non-Indian America: Why a Second American Founding Based on Principles
of Deep Diversity Is Needed, 25 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 61, 80-83 (2004).
354. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 513-14 (citing Mich. Citizens for Indep. Press v. Thornburgh,
868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1989), affd by an equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989) (per curiam)).
355. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
356. See LaVelle, supra note 154, at 759-76; Kimberly Radermacher, Case Comment, The
Ongoing Divestiture by the Supreme Court of Tribal Jurisdiction over Nonmembers, on and off the
Reservation-Nevada v. Hicks, 78 N.D. L. REV. 125 (2002).
357. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364-65.
358. 538 U.S. 701 (2003).
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meaning of federal civil rights statutes.359 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians"' is a strong example of an Indian law dispute posing
an important constitutional question for the Court to decide. While the
origins of the dispute involved the treaty rights of the Mille Lacs Band,36 '
the important constitutional concern that may have been more salient for
the individual Justices' voting preferences was the question of whether
the president can abrogate a treaty without express permission of
Congress.362 One could speculate that at least some or all of the five
Justices that voted for the Mille Lacs Band voted because they believed
the president did not have authority to unilaterally abrogate treaties-
while not having a salient opinion on the treaty interpretation questions
that followed.
Much more empirical work is possible here, for example, to
determine whether the Court's certiorari decisions are influenced by a
non-Indian law-related constitutional concern; whether lower federal and
state courts follow this pattern; whether the apparent pattern recurs
further back in Supreme Court history; and, in general, to provide
further evidence on the claims made in this Article.
The purpose of the survey is to provide a means for discussing the
possibility that the Rehnquist Court's decisions where tribal interests
were at stake were not federal Indian law decisions. This possibility is not
so much as raised in the scholarship analyzing these cases, with the
glaring exceptions of Dean David Getches' and Professor Phil Frickey's
work.3 3 It is a distinct possibility that the Indian law principles discussed,
analyzed, and applied by the Court are no more than window dressing to
the broader constitutional concerns attracting the Court's attention. If
this is plausible, then the way Indian law scholars and practitioners read
and analyze the Court's recent federal Indian law decisions must be
reexamined.
IV. IDENTIFYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRAGMATIC CONCERNS IN
THE INDIAN CASES
Lawrence Lessig's compelling article, "How I Lost the Big One,"
discussing his advocacy before the Supreme Court in Eldred v.
Ashcroft,36' should offer important tips to tribal advocates.36 Lessig lost
359. See id. at 709-12.
36o. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
36I. See id. at 196-200.
362. See id. at 188-95.
363. Cf RUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 158-83 (asserting that an "anti-anti-discrimination"
principle drives the Court's civil rights docket). See generally Frickey, supra note 12 (arguing that the
Supreme Court is in the process of remolding the foundational principles of federal Indian law to fit
within general public law); Getches, supra note 37 (arguing that states' rights, mainstream values, and
colorblind justice drive the Court's Indian law decisions).
364. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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the case but provided powerful insights into Supreme Court litigation:
Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. There were three key lawyers
on the case from Jones Day. Stewart was the first; then, Dan Bromberg
and Don Ayer became quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer had a
common view about how this case would be won: We would only win,
they repeatedly told me, if we could make the issue seem "important"
to the Supreme Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being
done to free speech and free culture; otherwise, the justices would
never vote against "the most powerful media companies in the
world.", 66
Lessig's mention of an "important" issue planted the seed, in many
respects, for this Article. Scholars had long scoured Supreme Court
opinions, papers of the Justices, and anecdotal evidence from Justices,
clerks, and litigants to discover the "important" issues that, first, make
cases "certworthy," or worthy of certiorari, and second, compel a
member of the Court to vote in a certain way. Lessig's story is a reminder
that the "important" issue sometimes is not obvious unless we are willing
to look in a different direction at the same questions. Indian law
advocates need to do the same thing.
Further consider Professor Lessig's review of the opinion in his case:
I first scoured the majority opinion, written by Ginsburg, looking for
how the court would distinguish the principle in this case from the
principle in [United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (I995)]. The
reasoning was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
core argument of our case did not even appear in the court's opinion. I
couldn't quite believe what I was reading. I had said that there was no
way this court could reconcile limited powers with the commerce
clause and unlimited powers with the progress clause. It had never
even occurred to me that they could reconcile the two by not
addressing the argument at all.' 67
Lessig's review of his own case sounds terrifyingly familiar to tribal
advocates reading their own cases. Critical arguments made by tribal
interests that may have had powerful sway with lower court judges
sometimes go nowhere with Supreme Court Justices-or are simply
ignored.
Tribal advocates are starting to learn the game, but sometimes there
is just not enough to work with. For example, early in the 2005 Term, the
Supreme Court heard arguments in Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi
Nation, a dispute between the Nation and the State of Kansas over
whether Kansas's motor fuel tax on retailers-which was paid by the
365. See Lessig, supra note 27.
366. Id. at 59.
367. Id. at 62.
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Nation when the retailers passed the tax through to their customers -was
preempted by federal law and tribal sovereignty."6 Justice Souter asked
the first question in both the state and tribal arguments-effectively
contextualizing the case against the tribal interests in the first moments
of the argument-of whether the tribe was acting as a government or as a
business. 369 In fact, the Nation made a powerful argument that every
dollar of a tax it intended to collect once the state tax was lifted would go
toward highway repairs and maintenance - a governmental function.37
The Court all but ignored that argument, refusing to apply the
preemption test at all.37' In essence, the Court refused to even apply
federal Indian law principles on the theory that the state levied the tax
outside of Indian Country.37 ' Indian law did not even apply in Wagnon.
What concern did the Court have when it decided Wagnon? One
possibility was that the Court was worried that the states and the federal
government might adapt the Nation's theory for their own purposes. In
critiquing the Nation's arguments, the Court appeared to imply that
these federal Indian law principles might translate to state and federal
tax questions.373 Perhaps the Court was worried that states would demand
a refund for money they paid in accordance with government contracts to
construction contractors based out of state where that money could be
traced to another state's taxation (a circumstance that occurs with
regularity in tribal construction projects374). Regardless, what is clear
368. 546 U.S. 95, 99-101 (2005).
369. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95 (No. 04-631) ("Justice Souter:
'My question is, Do we know, from the record, whether the tax that is assessed on the distributor is, in
fact, passed through to the tribe so that, in economic effect, the tribe is collecting, via pass-through, the
State tax and imposing its own tax and still selling at market prices?'); id. at 25 ("Justice Souter:
'Then what's [the Nation's] gripe? It wants a bigger profit? ... [I]f the tribe is collecting its tax, and it
does not have a claim to greater taxation or greater profit, then how is its sovereign right as a taxing
authority being interfered with?"').
370. See Brief for Respondent at 2, Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95 (No. 04-631) ("The state tax thus
interferes directly with a core attribute of tribal sovereignty-the Tribe's power to impose a fuel tax to
finance the construction and maintenance of reservation roads and bridges. The State's studied
ignorance of the Tribe's sovereign interest in taxation to support its infrastructure is ironic at best, as
the power to tax is the very attribute of its own sovereignty that the State purports to vindicate.
Despite the State's contentions, this case is not about economic advantage, but about how to
accommodate the competing interests of two legitimate sovereigns. The State's solution is to deny the
Tribe's interest in its entirety."); see also Wagnon, 546 U.S. at t30 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In sum,
the Nation operates the Nation Station in order to provide a service for patrons at its casino without,
in any way, seeking to attract bargain hunters on the lookout for cheap gas. Kansas' collection of its
tax on fuel destined for the Nation Station will effectively nullify the Nation's tax, which funds critical
reservation road-building programs, endeavors not aided by state funds. I resist that unbalanced
judgment.").
371. See Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 13-14 (majority opinion) (refusing to apply the preemption test); id.
at 1t5 (refusing to consider the road maintenance cost argument).
372. See id. at 113-15.
373. See id. at io7-o9.
374. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, The Power to Destroy, and the Michigan
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from Wagnon is that there was no important constitutional concern
supporting the tribal interests, nor were there secondary pragmatic
reasons significant enough to vote for the Prairie Band.
Tribal advocates are at a serious disadvantage in constitutional
litigation before the Supreme Court. As Justice Thomas pointed out,
there is nothing in the Constitution that reserves tribal sovereignty."'
While this might be the equivalent of Justice Black refusing to vote for
mandatory busing for public schools in order to implement desegregation
orders because the word "bus" doesn't appear in the Constitution, 6
Justice Thomas raised an important question that the Constitution does
not answer. Since the Constitution does not assist tribal interests as much
as, for example, the Tenth Amendment assists states,377 tribal interests
may have to look to other, more pragmatic concerns and consequences
that will persuade the Court. Tribal advocates in the Wagnon case did
attempt to persuade the Court by identifying considerable consequences
that would arise from a ruling in favor of the State of Kansas, but these
concerns did not persuade the Court in that instance.
This Part discusses four areas of federal Indian law that are strong
candidates for Supreme Court review and suggestions for identifying
important constitutional concerns or considerable pragmatic concerns
that will both compel a grant of certiorari and garner enough votes to
win a case here and there.
A. TRIBAL CRIMINAL AND CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS
_i. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
One area of difficulty for tribal advocates will be the area of tribal
criminal jurisdiction. As the following discussion shows, there are several
constitutional concerns that weigh against tribal interests, but there may
be some room to persuade the Court that tribal criminal jurisdiction is
important for pragmatic reasons.
The Supreme Court recently decided not to hear Means v. Navajo
Nation3 8 and a companion case, Morris v. Tanner,379 impressive victories
for tribal advocates. Means, a member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, faced
prosecution before the Navajo tribal courts for allegedly assaulting his
family members.38° He had argued that the Navajo Nation could not have
jurisdiction over him because he was not a member of that tribe-he was
Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 27 (2004).
375. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218-19 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
376. See ROSEN, supra note 217, at 157.
377. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, i66 (1992); Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 148 P.3d 1126, 1135-36 (Cal. 2006).
378. 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 381 (2006).
379. i6o Fed. App'x 6oo (9th Cir. 2oo5), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 379 (2006).
380. See Means v. Dist. Court of the Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Navajo Rptr. 528, 21 (1999).
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a nonmember Indian."' In 199o, Means' attorney, John Trebon, had
successfully argued before the Supreme Court that Indian tribes cannot
prosecute nonmember Indians in Duro v. Reina2 and was attempting to
re-establish that rule by asking the Court to strike down the "Duro Fix,"
upheld in United States v. Lara in a seven to two decision.""3 Lara seemed
to answer the question of whether tribes could prosecute nonmember
Indians, but two of the seven Justices in the majority-Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor-are no longer on the Court. Of the
remaining five members in the majority, one of them-Justice
Kennedy-said that under a different procedural posturing (an appeal of
the tribal court conviction), they might have voted to strike down the
"Duro Fix."' ' 4 Justice Thomas stated that he is waiting for the Court to
come to its senses in the entire body of federal Indian law and is willing
to reopen federal Indian law principles that have been settled for
centuries. 5' Both the Means and the Morris cases were appeals of tribal
court convictions. That left only three Justices in the majority, with new
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito the remaining uncertain votes. In
short, a seven to two Lara decision could have turned into a six to three
decision the other way. But the Court denied the petition for writ of
certiorari. 386
Counsel for Means and Morris could not have expected to win any
of their appeals in the tribal courts and lower federal courts because of
the decisiveness of the recent Lara decision. But they brought the cases
in a manner strategically designed to attract the Court's attention,
gambling that the Court was willing to entertain a challenge to the "Duro
Fix"-and all tribal court prosecutions-because Indian tribes are not
381. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 930-31 (9 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 381
(2oo6).
382. 495 U.S. 676,695-96 (199o).
383. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
384. See id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The present case, however, does not require us to
address these difficult questions of constitutional dimension. Congress made it clear that its intent was
to recognize and affirm tribal authority to try Indian nonmembers as inherent in tribal status. The
proper occasion to test the legitimacy of the Tribe's authority, that is, whether Congress had the power
to do what it sought to do, was in the first, tribal proceeding. There, however, Lara made no objection
to the Tribe's authority to try him. In the second, federal proceeding, because the express rationale for
the Tribe's authority to try Lara-whether legitimate or not-was inherent sovereignty, not delegated
federal power, there can be no double jeopardy violation.").
385. See id. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I do, however, agree that this case raises important
constitutional questions that the Court does not begin to answer. The Court utterly fails to find any
provision of the Constitution that gives Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty. The
Court cites the Indian Commerce Clause and the treaty power. I cannot agree that the Indian
Commerce Clause 'provide[s] Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian
affairs.' At one time, the implausibility of this assertion at least troubled the Court, and I would be
willing to revisit the question." (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192
(1989)) (citations omitted)).
386. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 127 S. Ct. 381 (2oo6); Morris v. Tanner, 127 S. Ct. 379 (2oo6).
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required by federal statute to appoint counsel for indigent defendants. 387
Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Lara seemed to keep the question
open." Moreover, nonmember Indians are unlikely to be able to vote in
tribal elections or are not eligible to sit on tribal court juries." 9 Justice
Kennedy, the force behind Duro v. Reina,39 was particularly concerned
about tribes that prosecute people without providing these criminal
process rights.39'
Even if the Court does not acknowledge an important constitutional
concern favoring tribal interests, important and significant pragmatic
concerns are present in these types of cases. Intermarriage between
tribes and increased tribal employment opportunities are longstanding
facts in most tribal communities, guaranteeing the presence of a
significant population of nonmember Indians on most reservations.39 '
Taking away federal recognition of and respect for the convictions of
nonmember Indians-like the Court did in Duro-created a significant
loophole in tribal law enforcement that even a lumbering bear like
Congress understood needed quick corrective action.393  The
consequences of creating yet another loophole in the tribal-federal-state
law enforcement jurisdictional scheme in Indian Country-the first
major loophole being the refusal of the Court to recognize tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe3 -
could be significant to Indian Country. If tribal advocates can provide
empirical research that shows there was an increase in crime (both
qualitatively and quantitatively) by non-Indians after Oliphant,39 it might
persuade a law-and-order Justice that the constitutional concerns are not
387. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
388. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 207-08.
389. Cf. id. at 208-09 (rejecting Lara's due process and equal protection arguments).
390. 495 U.S. 676 (i99o); see also Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Indian tribes should not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers),
rev'd sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 19i (1978).
391. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Constitution is based on a theory of
original, and continuing, consent of the governed. Their consent depends on the understanding that
the Constitution has established the federal structure, which grants the citizen the protection of two
governments, the Nation and the State. Each sovereign must respect the proper sphere of the other,
for the citizen has rights and duties as to both. Here, contrary to this design, the National Government
seeks to subject a citizen to the criminal jurisdiction of a third entity to be tried for conduct occurring
wholly within the territorial borders of the Nation and one of the States. This is unprecedented. There
is a historical exception for Indian tribes, but only to the limited extent that a member of a tribe
consents to be subjected to the jurisdiction of his own tribe. The majority today reaches beyond that
limited exception." (citations omitted)).
392. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law
on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1123, 1143-44 (1994); Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations
and Tribal Self-Governance, 8o N.D. L. REV. 691, 714-15 (2004).
393. See generally Newton, supra note 168; Skibine, supra note 168.
394. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
395. See generally Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-
First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REv. 697 (2oo6).
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dispositive.
Of course, Indian tribes are not states or the federal government."9
State and federal law enforcement come from a long history and practice
of coercing confessions from suspects3" (one of the reasons to guarantee
an attorney and a jury of peers) that is missing from most tribes. In fact,
the conviction rate of Indians in federal courts is astronomically high
because Indian defendants are far more likely to confess to crimes, a
result (it is said) of the Indian tradition to admit mistakes in order to
allow community healing to begin.""8 Moreover, Indian tribes often do
not have the resources to fund a public defender system;3. but neither do
tribal courts sentence the guilty to jail as a matter of course.'
There were reasons why the Court did not agree to hear the Means
and Morris cases. First, the Court doesn't like to reverse a seven to two
decision so quickly after announcing it. With the recent turnover on the
Court, quick reversals makes the Court look too much like a political
body, subject to the political whims of its members."' Second, neither the
Means nor the Morris case met the list of due process factors that
concerns Justice Kennedy. Both defendants were not indigent and were
represented by counsel in tribal court.4"' Navajo law even provides for
nonmember Indians like Means to participate in tribal politics (which he
396. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-83 (1896) (holding that the Bill of Rights does not
apply to tribal governments because they are not arms of the federal government); Angela R. Riley,
Good (Native) Governance, 1O7 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1050-51 (2007).
397. See generally Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U.
L. REV. 387, 473 (1996).
398. See, e.g., CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 244
(2004) (citing RUPERT Ross, DANCING WITH A GHOST: EXPLAINING INDIAN REALITY 13-14 (1992))
(discussing a "cultural requirement to full disclosure").
399. See Robert T. Anderson, Criminal Jurisdiction, Tribal Courts and Public Defenders, 13 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 144-45 (2003).
400. See, e.g., COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ed., supra note 29, § 9.09, at 769 ("Precontact tribal
traditions often regulated conduct by sanctions which Anglo-American law does not consider penal.");
id. § 4.o1[I][a], at 204-05 (noting that tribes often depended on "mockery, ostracism, ridicule, and
religious sanctions" for criminal violations instead of imprisonment); WATSON SMITH & JOHN M.
ROBERTS, ZUNI LAW: A FIELD OF VALUES 50-51 (1954) (noting that murder in traditional Zuni
communities was considered a private offense-not public, similar to a tort-and not subject to public
punishment).
401. See ROSEN, supra note 217, at 233 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts: "People don't want the
Court to seem to be lurching around because of changes in personnel").
402. See Morris v. Tanner, i6 Fed. App'x 652, 653-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing motions made by
Morris); Means v. Dist. Court of the Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Navajo Rptr. 528, 49 (1999) ("The
petitioner's attorney was asked whether Navajo Nation law affords criminal defendants all the rights
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution during oral argument, and he
evaded the question. Although such is not required by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, criminal
defendants in the Navajo Nation court system are entitled to the appointment of counsel if they are
indigent, and they are entitled to a jury composed of a fair cross-section of Navajo Nation population,
including non-Indians and nonmember Indians. The petitioner has all the rights he would have in a
state or federal court.").
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did) and even sit on juries (he refused to register). 3 But the next case in
the pipeline to the Court might include those factors.
What tribal advocates and policymakers should now be on the
lookout for are appeals of tribal court convictions of nonmember Indians
who are indigent, unrepresented, cannot sit on tribal court juries, and
who are sentenced to even a single day of jail. Russell Means arguably
now faces the justice of the Navajo Nation because he did not meet those
requirements. Forward-looking tribes are thinking about funding public
defender offices and appointed counsel procedures and adopting rules
that allow for criminal trial juries to include defendants' peers, and they
are wise to do so.
2. Tribal Civil Jurisdiction
In this area, there is not the same importance to the Court's
constitutional concerns as there is in the criminal jurisdiction area, but
the same questions are present.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Nevada v. Hicks held that tribal
courts do not have jurisdiction over federal civil rights claims by tribal
members against state officers for actions that occurred in Indian
Country.4"4 However, the opinion acknowledged an open question: "We
leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember
defendants in general."4" In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter raised
several questions as to whether tribal courts should ever have jurisdiction
over nonmember defendants. 46 Justice Souter's opinion suggests that at
least some members of the Court worry that subjecting nonmembers to
the processes and laws of Indian tribes might be a violation of due
process.4' There seems to be a worry that tribal laws are "unusually
difficult for an outsider to sort out." 4 8 As a response, Indian law scholars
have critiqued the very notion of implicit divestiture, arguing that the
Court's authority in the area is questionable and flawed.4' Others argue
that respect for tribal sovereignty should compel the Court to recognize
tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers."' Still others have argued that
the tribal law that might be confusing to an outsider never applies to
outsiders, and that tribal courts apply Anglo-American law to
nonmembers.4"'
403. See Means, 2 Navajo Rptr. 528, 47-49 (1999).
404. 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2oo).
405. Id. at 358 n.2.
4o6. See id. at 375-86 (Souter, J., concurring).
407. See id. at 384-85.
4o8. Id. at 385.
409. See, e.g., LaVelle, supra note 154.
4On. See generally Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court's Divestment and
Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, i8 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 147 (2ooo).
411 . See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal and Intratribal Common
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At one point, the Court acknowledged a concern that divesting tribal
courts of jurisdiction would be detrimental to tribal self-government and
the development of tribal institutions, ' but the Court does not appear to
be concerned with these questions any longer. Tribal advocates should
develop pragmatic reasons that would persuade the Court that
preserving tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers is important.
B. FEDERAL STATUTES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
Another area of difficulty is the question of whether federal laws
that do not state on their face that they apply to Indian tribes actually do
apply to Indian tribes."3 Federal employment rights statutes such as the
Fair Labor Standards Act414 and the National Labor Relations Act4' are
silent as to whether they apply to Indian tribes as employers. Other
federal statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,416
explicitly exclude Indian tribes while others, such as certain criminal417
and environmental1' statutes, explicitly include Indian tribes. The federal
circuit courts of appeal have adopted differing-and one could argue,
conflicting-common law tests to determine whether or not federal
statutes of general applicability will apply.4 9
Whether the Court-assuming it agrees to hear a case in this area (it
has not done so yet)-decides that a federal statute of general
applicability will apply to Indian tribes most likely will depend far more
on the federal policy annunciated by Congress in the statute than on
foundational principles of tribal sovereignty. Consider a D.C. Circuit
case, San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB,4"' for example.
Tribal advocates argued forcefully that foundational principles of tribal
sovereignty and federal Indian law compel the court to find that the
National Labor Relations Act does not apply to Indian tribes or their
business interests,4"' arguments all but ignored by the D.C. Circuit
Law, 43 Hous. L. REV. 701, 739 (2006).
412. See, e.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
413. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1982 ed., supra note 29, § 2.03, at 128-32; William Buffalo
& Kevin J. Wadzinski, Application of Federal and State Labor and Employment Laws to Indian Tribal
Employers, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1365 (995); Singel, supra note 392.
414. See Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4 F.3d 490,493 (7th Cir. 1993).
415. See NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1196 (lOth Cit. 2002).
416. See Charland v. Little Six, Inc., 198 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
417. See Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 327 F.3 d lO19, 1022 (loth Cir.
2003) (discussing the Johnson Act).
418. See generally James M. Grijalva, The Origins of EPA's Indian Program, i5 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 191 (2006).
419. See, e.g., Singel, supra note 392, at 702 n.87, 703 n.94 (listing cases from different circuits that
follow conflicting approaches).
420. 475 F.3d 13o6 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
421. See Petitioners' Opening Brief at 21-34, San Manuel, 475 F.3d 13o6 (No. 05-1392).
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panel.4" The case could have come down to non-Indian law principles:
first, whether Congress originally intended the Act to apply to tribal
businesses in 1935;423 and, second, if not, whether the Act's scope can
change over decades to encompass the relatively recent phenomenon of
successful tribal business operations employing numerous nonmembers.
The second issue, even if the D.C. Circuit does not reach it, might
become an important constitutional reason for the Court to grant
certiorari in an appeal from either side.
C. TENTH AMENDMENT
A recent addition to the discussion of federal Indian law is the Tenth
Amendment. Long considered to be part of the recognition of the
historical fact that the states have little or no stake in the federal-tribal
relationship,424 the Rehnquist Court's buttressing of states' rights appears
to have emboldened states' claims based on the Tenth Amendment
against tribal interests in recent years.425 There are two major areas in
which the states are making Tenth Amendment claims. First, states are
arguing that the Department of Interior's authority to take land into
trust for the benefit of Indian tribes-and the concomitant immunity
from state tax and regulatory authority-violates states' reserved rights
under the Tenth Amendment."' Second, in one state supreme court,
tribal political activities that appear to interfere with state political
activities have triggered the Tenth Amendment in a manner sufficient to
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.4"7 The question that the Court could
decide soon is whether the Tenth Amendment is important enough to
limit certain exercises of tribal sovereignty.
422. See San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1314-19.
423. See Singel, supra note 392, at 719-25 (arguing that Congress did not).
424. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996) ("If anything, the Indian Commerce
Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government than does
the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from the fact that the States still exercise some
authority over interstate trade but have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce
and Indian tribes."); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989); County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985); Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3 d 15, 39-40
(Ist Cir. 2007) (en banc); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1307-08 (N.D.N.Y.
1983); Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 1359, 1368-69 (D. Conn. 1982) (quoting National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976)); AMAR, supra note 26, at IO7-O8.
425. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 189 (D.R.I. 2003), affd sub nom. Carcieri v.
Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15 (ist Cir. 2007) (en banc); City of Roseville v. Norton, 219 F. Supp. 2d 130,
154 (D.D.C. 2002), affd, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Citizens for Safer
Cmtys. v. Norton, 541 U.S. 974 (2004); In re A.B., 663 N.w.2d 625, 636-37 (N.D. 2003), cert. denied
sub nom. Hoots v. K.B., 541 U.S. 972 (2004).
426. See Carcieri, 29o F. Supp. 2d at 89-9o; City of Roseville, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 154.
427. See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 148 P.3 d 1126, 1135-39 (Cal.
2006).
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D. INDIAN LAND CLAIMS
One final area worth discussing here is the question of longstanding
Indian land claims. Here, the Court appears to recognize no
constitutional concerns that weigh in favor of Indian tribes, but there are
significant pragmatic concerns. The Court is very worried that Indian
land claims and other claims to sovereignty will upset the "settled
expectations" of private landowners and state and local governments."'
But, if there are significant constitutional concerns, they are property
rights that should favor tribal and federal interests."' However, these
cases are examples of where pragmatic concerns appear to trump any
constitutional concerns.
In 2005's City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,430 the Supreme
Court rewrote the rules on "ancient" tribal claims to sovereignty by
allowing-for the first time in recent memory and with the last time
benefiting private property owners43' -state and local governments
opposing tribal sovereignty and Indian tribes to raise equitable
defenses.43 In other words, the Court held that the Nation (and the
United States) waited too long to bring their claims.433 Although City of
Sherrill did not adjudicate an Indian land claim (it had already been
settled),434 the Second Circuit relied upon the decision as the basis for
dismissing land claims in Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki;435 claims valued
at hundreds of millions of dollars."' The State of New York and its
subdivisions now argue in every land claim pleading that too much time
has passed to restore tribal sovereignty and Indian lands.437 It seems
certain that tribes bringing land claims and other long-standing claims to
sovereignty must traverse this new (and hostile) world of equitable
defenses in order to prevail. The very notion of an Indian land claim may
soon disappear. State and local governments may have found their trump
card in dealing with the troublesome tribal claims to land and
sovereignty.
But the opponents of tribal land claims may be too smart for their
own good. The dismissal of Indian land claims on the basis that too much
time has passed since the transactions in which Indian land ownership
428. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 218 (2005).
429. Cf. Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1998); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
430. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
431. The last time was Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892).
432. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213-14.
433. See id. at 217-19.
434. See id. at 202.
435. 413 F.3 d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2022 (2006).
436. See id. at 268 (stating that claims were worth $248 million).
437. And with some success. Compare Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. o5-CV-2887,
2o06 WL 3501099 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 20o6) (dismissing land claims), with Oneida Indian Nation v.
New York, No. 5 7 4 -CV-18 7 , 2007 WL 15oo489 (N.D.N.Y. May 21, 2007) (preserving land claims).
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passed into the hands of non-Indians and non-tribal governments may
reduce state and local government liability, but the liability could shift to
the federal government. Thousands of Indian land claims involving
millions upon millions of acres now lay dormant, preserved in
accordance with a 1982 federal statute, waiting to be activated and
prosecuted by the Department of Justice. Many, if not the vast majority,
of these land claims are based upon events that transpired long ago and
could be subject to the equitable defenses the City of Sherrill Court held
could be applied to "ancient" tribal claims. If these claims are barred by
the passage of time, it will be because of the failure of the United States
to prosecute the land claims. As a result, the United States will be liable
to the Indian tribes who lost out on their land claims. Tens of billions of
dollars-and perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars-are at risk as a
direct result of the City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation cases.439
Consider an older case. In 1968, the Supreme Court decided
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States." The posture of the case
was most unusual in that both the named parties-the Tribe and the
Government-asked the Court to affirm a Court of Claims ruling."' The
State of Wisconsin, appearing as amicus curiae, was the only party
arguing in favor of reversal."2 The case arose when Congress enacted the
Menominee Termination Act of 1954, disbanding the tribal government
and transferring the Tribe's assets to a private corporation owned and
operated by the tribal members."3 Menominees continued to exercise
their hunting and fishing rights guaranteed by the 1854 Treaty of Wolf
River, however, and the State began to enforce its laws and regulations
on them, culminating in a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision holding
that the 1954 termination act had abrogated the 1854 treaty rights.'" The
Tribe then turned to the federal claims courts and sought just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment against the United States for
the loss of the treaty-protected hunting and fishing rights. 5 The Court of
Claims held that the Tribe was not entitled to compensation because the
treaty rights had not been abrogated, 6 leading to the unusual posture of
the argument before the Supreme Court, with the United States hoping
to avoid liability by convincing the Court to strike down the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's decision.
438. 28 U.S.C. § 24 15 (b) (2000).
439. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Land Claims Time-Bomb, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 19,
2007, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cftn?id=io96414372.
440. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
441. See id. at 407.
442. See id.
443. See id. at 4o8.
444. See id. at 407-o8 (citing State v. Sanapaw, 124 N.W.2d 41, 46 (Wis. 1963))
.
445. Id. at 407.
446. See id.
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There are reasons to believe that same scenario could play out in the
context of Indian land claims barred by equitable defenses-and perhaps
it will play out that way in hundreds or even thousands of cases. First, in
these cases, the basis for bringing a land claim is a violation of a federal
statute or an Indian treaty provision. The New York land claims, for
example, arise under the Trade and Intercourse Acts, where the federal
government had a duty to prevent-and if not prevent, then to seek a
reversal of-the underlying transactions leading to the land claims."7 In
the case of land claims arising out of treaty provisions, the claims are
based on a treaty provision that places an affirmative mandate upon the
federal government to prevent the dispossession of Indian lands. In
many, many circumstances, federal government officials participated in
the acts of dispossession-clear acts of illegality."a Second, given that the
federal government often is the only party capable of suing to recover
Indian lands or to seek compensation because of state sovereign
immunity,"9 the equitable defense applies against the government for
failure to act. In effect, the federal government is at fault and therefore
culpable.45
Moreover, before any tribe can proceed with a claim under U.S.C.
§ 2415, the federal government must exercise discretion in determining
whether or not to prosecute the claim on behalf of the tribe.45' In other
words, each § 2415 claim places a strict duty on the federal government.
Since 1983, when the government published the land claims in the
Federal Register, 2 the Department of Justice has chosen to take up only
a few.453 Over two decades have passed since the government published
447. See generally Robert N. Clinton & Margaret Tobey Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L.
REV. 17 (979).
448. See, e.g., Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922).
449. See, e.g., Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2ooi) (suit by United States on behalf of Indian
tribe against state); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 5oi U.S. 775, 783-85 (I991) (rejecting tribal
suit against state on basis of state sovereign immunity).
450. In fact, Congress enacted the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-394 (1982), in
part, due to concerns that the United States faced massive liability for failure to prosecute tribal land
claims. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-954, at 6 (1982) (citing Covelo Indian Cmty. v. Watt, 551 F. Supp. 366
(D.D.C. 1982), affd, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23138 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1982)).
451. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (2ooo) ("That, for those claims that are on either of the two lists
published pursuant to the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982, any right of action shall be barred
unless the complaint is filed within (i) one year after the Secretary of the Interior has published in the
Federal Register a notice rejecting such claim or (2) three years after the date the Secretary of the
Interior has submitted legislation or legislative report to Congress to resolve such claim or more than
two years after a final decision has been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required by
contract or by law, whichever is later.") (emphasis added).
452. See 48 FED. REG. 13698 (Mar. 25, 5983).
453. See, e.g., Bay Mills Indian Cmty. v. W. United Life Assurance Co., No. 9 6-CV-275, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20782 (W.D. Mich. Dec. It, 1998), aff'd, 208 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 2000); Bay Mills Indian
Cmty. v. State, 626 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. App. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 5303 (2002).
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the land claims. Given the harshness of the equity rules announced by
federal courts, it may already be too late for the federal government to
recover. Federal government liability may be accruing this moment.
CONCLUSION... AND A CAVEAT
What remains of federal Indian law in Supreme Court
jurisprudence? What remains of the rule of law in this entire field? The
foundational principles that resonated with the Marshall, Warren, and
Burger Courts have not been persuasive to the Rehnquist or Roberts
Courts. Given the Court's unwillingness to trace these foundational
principles to the Constitution, it would appear that these principles no
longer carry the day. Did these principles ever carry the day in the
Supreme Court, even for the Courts that created and cemented them? Is
"ruthless pragmatism" the guiding principle of the Roberts Court's
Indian law cases? Perhaps federal Indian law is dead, if it ever existed.
Observers of federal Indian law often chuckle when they read in The
Brethren about how Supreme Court Justice Brennan once referred to
Antoine v. Washington,454 a 1975 case about the prosecution of a pair of
Colville tribal members, as a "chickenshit" case. Or how Justice Harlan
referred to 1970's Tooahnippah v. Hicke15' as a "peewee" case. Indian
law advocates chuckle because the Supreme Court accepts far more
Indian law cases for review than would be expected, given the decreasing
opportunities to "arouse the judicial libido."
In I99I, H.W. Perry interviewed several Supreme Court Justices and
some of their former clerks in a study to determine what makes a case
"certworthy." One of the Justices, who identified him or herself as a
"Westerner," referred to Indian law cases as "crud cases" worthy of
assignment only to junior Justices. 4"6 But in the same breath, the
Westerner Justice said, "Actually, I think the Indian cases are kind of
fascinating. It goes into history and you learn about it, and the way we
abused some of the Indians, we, that is the U.S. government." '457 That
justice then noted that, in the Rehnquist Court, there were three
Westerners and they all had a special interest in western water law and in
Indian law. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor are both
from Arizona and Justice Kennedy is from California. Given that the
Supreme Court's "Rule of Four" states that it takes the vote of four of
the nine Justices to grant certiorari in any given case, it would appear
that in many Indian law cases, the three Westerners needed only one
more vote to grant "cert." Perhaps this helped to explain why the Court
454- 420 U.S. 194 0975).
455. 397 U.S. 598 (1970).
456. PERRY, supra note 188, at 262.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 261.
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heard so many Indian law cases during the Rehnquist Court era.
But Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor are no longer on
the Court. They have been replaced by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, neither of whom could be called Westerners. The only Westerner
Justice that remains is Justice Kennedy. Two Indian law cases have been
accepted this term already, but upon closer reflection, one realizes they
are not cases about federal Indian law principles, but rather are cases
about statutory interpretation and administrative law. In the 2005 Term,
the Court heard only one Indian law case, Wagnon v. Prairie Band of
Potawatomi Indians459-and that case had been granted certiorari during
the 2004 Term when all three Westerners remained on the Court."6
Is Indian law no longer a favorite of Supreme Court certiorari
decisions? Consider the cases that the Roberts Court has refused to hear:
(i) Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,46 I where the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals struck down Cayuga land claims amounting to more than $200
million; (2) South Dakota v. Department of the Interior462 and Utah v.
Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians,63 two claims from states arguing that the
federal law allowing the Bureau of Indian Affairs to take land into trust
for Indian tribes was unconstitutional; and (3) Means v. Navajo Nation464
and Morris v. Tanner,465 two cases arguing that the federal statute
affirming that tribes have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians
was unconstitutional. While there were plausible reasons for the Court to
deny cert. in these cases, perhaps the sole Westerner remaining on the
Court can no longer garner the votes.'6 For the eight non-Westerners on
the Court, perhaps Indian law simply is not "certworthy." We'll see how
the Roberts Court develops. As many observers know, the Chief Justice
argued two Indian law cases before the Supreme Court-Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government46 (on behalf of the State of
Alaska) and Rice v. Cayetano68 (on behalf of the State of Hawaii), both
of which were devastating losses for Indian Country-so we know he is
459. 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
460. 543 U.S. 1185 (2005).
46t. 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2022 (2006).
462. 423 F.3 d 790 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 67 (2006).
463. 428 F.3 d 966 (Ioth Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 38 (2006).
464. 432 F.3 d 924 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 381 (2006).
465. No. 03-35922, i6O Fed. App'x 6oo (9th Cir., Dec. 22, 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 379 (2006).
466. See Posting of Matthew L.M. Fletcher to For the Seventh Generation Blog, http://tribal-
law.blogspot.com/2oo7/o4/s-cts-new-indian-law-agenda.html (Apr. 4, 2007) (noting that the Roberts
Court accepted no new Indian law cases in the October 2oo6 Term). But see Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 491 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 829 (2008).
467. 520 U.S. 522 (1998).
468. 528 U.S. 495 (2ooo). Roberts also served as counsel of record for the petitioner in Roberts v.
United States, 529 U.S. i io8 (20oo) (No. 99-1174). See also Posting of Matthew L.M. Fletcher to Turtle
Talk Blog, http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2007/ 3o/chief-justice-roberts-federal-indian-law/ (Oct.
30, 2007).
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knowledgeable about some aspects of Indian law. One question yet to be
answered is whether the Chief Justice transforms his professional
expertise and experience in federal Indian law questions into votes for
certiorari.
Miigwetch.
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